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Fostering Perspective-Taking in Social Interaction
Debby Damen1, Per van der Wijst1, Marije van Amelsvoort1, Emiel Krahmer1
1 Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2,
5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands
{D.J.Damen, Per.vanderWijst, M.A.A.vanAmelsvoort, E.J.Krahmer}@uvt.nl
Abstract. Recent studies have repeatedly shown that interlocutors sometimes 
fail to (accurately) regard the perspective of their interaction partner, leading to 
(egocentric) errors in social interaction. However, it remains scarcely 
investigated how interlocutors can be stimulated to accurately engage in the 
process of perspective-taking during the interaction that requires perspective-
taking to occur. The aim of this project is to fill this knowledge gap by focusing 
on how the perceptual and conceptual domains of perspective-taking can be
facilitated by a stimulated attention to the other’s perspective. Four studies are 
presented, each focusing on fostering different domains of perspective-taking. 
Keywords: perspective-taking, egocentrism, circular questions, mediation
1   Introduction
The literature shows a puzzling picture with regard to interlocutors’ ability and 
propensity to correctly engage in the process of perspective-taking. On the one hand, 
studies evidenced that people succeed at assessing and adapting their communication 
to their interlocutor’s knowledge [1], [2], [3]. On the other hand, however, we find 
studies indicating that people do not always engage in an accurate audience design 
[4], [5], [6], and that they can even fall prone to their own egocentric perspective [7],
[8], [9], [10]. According to these studies, language production and comprehension is 
not necessarily anchored to the interlocutor’s informational need, but more to a
person’s own knowledge and attentional state, resulting in behavior that is based on 
information immediately accessible to persons themselves. Following this approach, 
another’s knowledge state is only considered in a later, optional adjustment stage in 
which people can chose whether to adjust their behavior to the other’s informational 
need or not. Scholars defending the latter view argue for an egocentricity bias [6],
[11], [12]. According to this bias, peoples’ own mental state is functioning as a 
representational default from which the other’s knowledge state and/or perspective is 
derived [13], [14]. Engaging in perspective-taking is then considered to be a cognitive 
effortful process that can result in egocentric anchor mistakes when people do not 
correct for their automatic response. Failing to get beyond this default leads to 
egocentric errors in interactions [5], [8], [9], [10], [13], [15], [16], [17], [18].
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From a pragmatic point of view, it is interesting to investigate whether previously 
found egocentric errors [15], [17] can be countered by a mental activation of the 
others’ (different) perspective. What if interlocutors in the abovementioned studies 
were made explicitly aware of the others’ different perspective, would they still have 
fallen prone to their egocentric knowledge? This question is also interesting for social 
practices that try to enhance perspective-taking during social interaction. Being 
guided by the argument that accurate perspective-taking is at the core of the 
maintenance of interpersonal relationships [19], [20], therapeutic and/or conflict 
resolution practices employ various questioning techniques that are believed to elicit 
perspective-taking during the interaction [21]. One questioning-technique that is 
explicitly used to enhance perspective-taking processes during social interaction is the 
so-called ‘circular-questioning’ technique [21], [22], also described as ‘circular’ 
questions or ‘mind-reading’ questions [23], [24], [25], and ‘other-awareness 
reflexive’ questions [26]. Circular questions found their advent in the systemic family 
therapy [22] that treats families as a ‘system’ in which all members have certain roles 
and behavioral patterns. The behavioral patterns are circular in the sense that each 
(behavioral) change in the system asks for another (behavioral) change in return, 
resulting in circular patterns that keep the (malfunctioning) system sustained. Circular 
questions are used to elicit a change in addressees’ thought or behavioral pattern, by 
asking members of the system to place themselves in another member’s position 
while they provide an answer to a circular question (e.g., “How do you think member 
X feels when you behave in a Y way?”). Although the circular questioning approach 
is elaborately discussed and employed by therapeutic and conflict resolution settings 
[21], [27], [28], [29], empirical tests on the assumed relationship between the 
questioning-technique and the perspective-taking process are yet to be performed.  
The empirical aim of this PhD project is to explore whether perspective-taking can 
be enhanced during the social interaction by employing the underlying mechanism of 
the circular questioning technique, namely by asking adults to regard their 
interlocutor’s perspective during the perspective-taking tasks. This aim is currently 
being investigated in four experimental studies, each focusing on a different 
perspective domain. Results of these studies provide more insight in how perspective-
taking processes are involved during language production and comprehension
processes, and how egocentric anchoring mistakes can be accounted for. Practical 
implications can be sought in the field of therapeutic or conflict resolution settings, in 
which perspective-taking is considered to be an important factor contributing to the 
problem’s resolution [30], and the restoration or maintenance of interpersonal 
relations [19], [20].
1.1   Study 1
Perspective-Taking in Referential Communication: Does Stimulated Attention to 
Addressee’s Perspective Influence Speakers’ Reference Production? The first 
study and follow-up study investigated the perceptual perspective-taking process (L1 
visuospatial processes in [31]) during an interaction in which interlocutors referred to 
common-ground objects. We investigated whether speakers’ referential 
communication benefits from an explicit focus on addressees’ perspective. Dyads 
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took part in a referential communication game and were allocated to one of three 
experimental settings. Each of these settings elicited a different perspective mindset 
(none, self-focus, other-focus). In the two perspective settings, speakers were 
explicitly instructed to regard their addressee’s (other-focus) or their own (self-focus) 
perspective before construing their referential message. 
Following [7], speakers were asked to describe mutually visible geometrical 
figures in such a way that the addressee could indicate the intended one out of a set of 
four. The four figures were physically presented on the table in front of both 
interlocutors. These same figures were depicted on speakers’ private computer screen 
from which speakers were instructed to block one figure and, subsequently, to 
identify another figure on the table in front of them (Fig. 1). The occluded figure 
differed either in size or color from the three mutually visible figures. This occluded
figure thus constituted speakers’ privileged ground, whereas the other three (including 
the target object) were part of speakers’ and addressees’ common-ground. Speakers’ 
privileged figure could act as a “curse of knowledge” [32], and influence speakers’ 
tendency to leak information that could cue the identity of the hidden figure. Since all 
three common-ground figures had the same color and size, including color and size 
attributes would be redundant for addressees’ selection process. However, since 
speakers were confronted with a privileged figure that always showed a contrast in 
either size or color to the target figure, their egocentric perspective could lead them to 
overspecify their target descriptions.
Fig. 1. The experimental setting in which the speaker (on the bottom) identified 
figures to the addressee (on the top).
Speakers’ self- versus other-focus was manipulated by asking them explicitly to 
either regard their own (self-focus) or their addressee’s (other-focus) perspective 
before they identified the target object. The self- versus other-focus was 
operationalized by asking speakers to answer a perspective question portrayed on the 
computer screen next to them. In the self-focus setting, speakers answered the 
question reinforcing their egocentric perspective: “Which four figures are visible to 
you?”. This in contrast to the speakers in the other-focus setting who were asked to 
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regard the perspective of their addressee: “Which three figures are visible to your 
addressee?”. Speakers answered the question by selecting the figures on their private 
computer screen. To eliminate the possibility that the self-focused speakers would 
simply select all figures as a response to the question, a fifth figure was added to the 
four presented on the computer screen. The fifth figure’s position and shape was 
balanced across all trials. To investigate the influence of our perspective 
manipulation, we allocated one third of the speakers to a baseline setting. In this 
setting, we did not reinforce speakers’ self- versus other-focus. In this way, we were 
able to examine how speakers’ reference production in the self- versus other-focused 
settings would diverge from a baseline situation. We measured the extent to which 
speakers were influenced by their privileged knowledge as a function of the 
perspective setting they participated in. For this, we counted the adjectives uttered 
that matched the contrast (in either size or color) between the target figure and 
speakers’ privileged figure.
Results indicated that eliciting speakers’ self- versus other-focus did not influence 
their reference production. We did find that speakers with an elicited egocentric 
perspective reported higher perspective-taking tendencies than speakers in the other 
two settings. These tendencies correlated with actual referring behavior during the 
game, indicating that speakers who reported a high perspective-taking tendency were 
less likely to make egocentric errors such as leaking information privileged to 
speakers themselves. These findings are explained using the objective self-awareness 
theory. A follow-up study addressed the limitations of the first study and measured 
speakers’ objective self-awareness in relation to the perspectives elicited during the 
experiment. The results are currently being analyzed and will be available at the end 
of May 2017.
1.2 Study 2
Perspective-Taking in Spatial Communication: Elicited Allocentric Attention 
Increases Spontaneous Perspective-Taking. The second study investigated whether 
a stimulated attention to someone else’s visual perspective can help speakers 
overcome their natural tendency to relate objects on the basis of their egocentric 
perspective. Speakers took part in a spatial perspective-taking task during which they 
indicated the location of an object in relation to another in a photographed scene [33], 
[34]. In this scene, objects were lying on either sides of the table with a man sitting in
between these objects (Fig. 1). Before the start of the experiment, speakers were 
allocated to one of the three perspective settings (none, self-focus, other-focus). In the 
self- and other-focus settings, speakers were trained to either regard their own (self-
focus) or someone else’s’ (other-focus) visual perspective (i.e., L2 visuospatial 
perspective-taking processes in [31]). That is, self-focused speakers indicated how the 
objects presented in the scene appeared to them, whereas other-focused speakers 
indicated how these objects appeared to the man depicted in the photograph (Fig. 2).
Participants were exposed to four perspective-questions, and in all four questions they 
indicated their own or the man’s perspective on the presented objects (i.e., mug, 
laptop, lamp, and picture frame). In the remaining setting, speakers’ egocentric or 
allocentric attention was not elicited. This setting thus acted as a baseline setting. 
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After the training session and several filler questions, participants were again 
confronted with the photographed scene and asked to indicate on which side of the 
table the book in the picture was placed (Fig. 1). Participants could either take an 
egocentric perspective and describe the books’ location using themselves as an anchor 
point, or they could take on an allocentric perspective and describe the books’ 
location from the man’s point of view. Findings revealed that a stimulated allocentric 
attention fostered spontaneous perspective-taking. Other-focused speakers were more 
likely to spontaneously describe the book’s location from the visual perspective of the 
man in the picture (i.e., “(the book is placed) on the left side of the table”), than self-
focused speakers.
Fig. 1. The photographed scene presented to participants. Participants were asked to indicate 
the location of the book lying on the table. They could either use themselves as spatial anchor 
point (i.e., “(the book is placed) on the right side of the table”) or take on an allocentric 
perspective (i.e., “(the book is placed) on the left side of the table”).
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Fig. 2. An example of a perspective-training question. These training questions were only 
exposed to participants in the self- and other-focused settings. The self-focused participants 
answered the question: “How do you see the mug?”. Participants in the other-focused setting 
replied to the question: “How does the man see the mug?”. Participants answered the question 
by selecting the option that corresponded to the elicited perspective (left option, right option
respectively).  
1.3 Study 3
Inferential Perspective-Taking: Does Stimulated Attention to Addressee’s 
Mental Representation Influence Speakers’ Perspective-Taking? The previous 
study indicated that making people (constantly) aware of another person’s visual 
perspective fosters spontaneous perspective-taking. The question remains, however, 
whether this effect also occurs when differences in perspectives are less tangible. 
While stepping in someone else’s shoes allows us to literally look through this 
person’s eyes, inferring what is going on inside this person’s head is not so apparent. 
Since feelings, thoughts and mental states occur solely in the mind of interlocutors, 
stepping in someone else’s mental shoe is a difficult process that is susceptible to 
inference errors. Previous research argues for an egocentric bias [11], claiming that 
people use their own mental state as a representational default to infer someone else’s. 
This study investigates whether a stimulated attention to another’s mental 
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representation can help people overcome their egocentric bias while inferring this 
person’s mental state.  
A prestudy is currently being conducted (till July 2017) investigating whether we 
are able to replicate the “curse of knowledge” effect found by Keysar [32]. In 
Keysar’s study, people fell prone to their egocentric perspective while inferring the 
perspective of another. Participants read a scenario in which the protagonist took his 
parents to a restaurant recommended by his colleague. Whereas one half of the 
participants learned that the protagonist and his parents had a remarkable dining 
experience there, the other half learned that the experience had been a miserable one. 
The following day, the protagonist replied by e-mail to his colleague: “You wanted to 
know about the restaurant: well, marvelous, just marvelous”. When participants were 
asked to indicate how the colleague would interpret the comment, Keysar [32] found 
that the e-mail communicating a sarcastic intention (i.e., in the poor dining 
experience) caused participants to wrongly infer that the colleague would interpret the 
comment as a sarcastic one rather than as a sincere message. This in contrast to the e-
mail communicating a sincere intention (i.e., in the remarkable dining experience). 
Please note that in the sarcastic condition, only the participants were privileged with 
the knowledge that the dining experience had been poor, and that the colleague of the 
protagonist had no other reason than to belief that the message had been a sincere one. 
Hence, participants reading the sarcastic message were cursed by their privileged 
knowledge: they wrongly inferred the colleague’s mental state by making use of their 
egocentric perspective. 
After the prestudy has been conducted, we will investigate whether stimulating 
people’s attention to addressee’s mental representation helps them to overcome this 
curse of knowledge and to correctly infer another’s conceptual perspective 
(September – November 2017). 
1.3 Study 4
Inferential Perspective-Taking: Changing Beliefs. This study will explore the 
extent to which interlocutors are able to change their (already) established beliefs by 
stimulating their attention to their interlocutor’s mental state. This question is most 
relevant for social practices that try to enhance disputants mutual understanding (and 
change/correct previous established beliefs) by eliciting disputants’ perspective-
taking. This study will be conducted from January till March, 2018. 
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Abstract. 652 participants conducted a two-person negotiation involving the 
sale/purchase of a used car. The first price 272 (41.7%) participants actually 
asked/offered during their negotiation differed from their intended first 
asking/offer price. Participants whose intended and actual first prices remained 
the same (‘maintainers’) tended to obtain better outcomes. Intended first price 
‘changers’ tended to obtain relatively worse outcomes regardless of whether 
their actual first price had created a ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ initial negotiation 
position than what would have been the case if they had announced their 
intended first price. Logistic regression tests (employing 21 independent/
‘predictor’ variables) indicated that such ‘changers’, ‘maintainers’, 
‘strengtheners’ and ‘weakeners’ had different identity profiles, pre-negotiation 
perceptions and expectations, and engaged in systematically different 
negotiation behavior. This juncture between a person’s privately held intended 
first price and their publicly expressed actual first price has important 
implications for our understanding of the factors underlying successful 
bargaining, decision-making and ‘mind-changing’.
Keywords: intended asking/offer prices, negotiation, uncertainty, mind-
changing.
1 Introduction
This paper reports findings from a study of intended-actual first asking/offer price 
changing in a distributive negotiation exercise. The study shows that participants who 
announced a different first asking/offer price (hereafter ‘first price’) from their 
intended first price tended to compromise their negotiation outcome. More generally,
those participants who maintained or changed and/or strengthened or weakened their 
intended first price comprise persons with significantly different identity profiles, pre-
negotiation perceptions and expectations that engage in systematically different forms 
of initial and subsequent negotiation behavior.
Very few researchers have examined negotiators’ intended first prices or have 
appeared to appreciate that negotiators’ intended first prices may not always be the 
same as their actual first prices. For example, in three studies that employed ‘intended 
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first price’ as an independent variable, the researchers actually or implicitly treated 
subjects’ intended first prices as a proxy equivalent of their actual, first announced 
prices [1-3]. There appears to be only one study [4] that not only explicitly recognizes 
that a negotiator’s first announced price may actually be different to his/her intended 
first price, but also reports findings that display evident, outcome-related 
consequences of any discrepancy between these two types of prices.
1.1   Study Conducted
The dataset examined for this study comprises 652 participants who took part in a 
two-person negotiation exercise involving the sale/purchase of a used car. The bulk of 
this data was collected—at three British universities and on eight separate 
occasions—from: i) six groups of postgraduate (MBA and MSc) business students; ii) 
one group of postgraduate law students; and: iii) one group of undergraduate business 
students. On two other occasions data was collected from groups of professional 
sales/purchasing negotiators (some of whom were now managers of such negotiators) 
employed at: i) a major European supplier of offshore oil and gas equipment; and: ii)
a multi-national motor vehicle manufacturer and retailer. Collectively, these 
participants—though predominantly British, Chinese, Indian or Nigerian—were from 
60 different countries, aged between 19-62 years (M = 25.1 years) and had a stated 
level of “negotiation-involving employment experience” that ranged from zero 
(68.9%) to 29 years (M = 0.94 years). 333 (51.1%) participants were male and 319 
(48.9%) female.
Before each of these ten classroom-based negotiation sessions, a ‘General 
Information’ handout was sent to the participants describing the car on offer, details 
of the sale (the potential buyer of the car in question was responding to an
advertisement the seller had placed in a motor trader magazine that included a specific
asking price for this car—“£8,500.”), and the exercise objective (i.e., “Your task is to 
negotiate with the other person in your group and reach the best possible mutually 
agreed deal for the sale/purchase of this car.”).
At the beginning of each negotiation session, participants were randomly allocated 
the role of the seller or buyer of the car in question, given a ‘Confidential 
Information’ handout to read (which included additional and private information 
pertinent to their particular buyer or seller role), and asked to make “final 
preparations” for their negotiation. Before commencing their negotiation (and, 
importantly, without yet knowing the identity of the person with whom they would be 
negotiating), each participant completed a single-page questionnaire that asked them 
to provide their aforementioned identity details and to specify (in the following 
order): i) their ‘aspiration price’ (i.e., the best possible price they believed they would 
actually be able to sell/purchase the car); ii) their intended first asking/offer price; iii) 
their ‘walk-away price’ (for the sellers, the lowest price they would be willing to 
accept and, for the buyers, the highest price they would be willing to pay for the car in 
question); and: iv) the price they thought would be the “fairest” sale/purchase price—
“for both the buyer and the seller”—for the car. Participants were also asked to state 
(on a scale ranging from 0% to 100%) how confident they were that they actually 
would be able to sell/buy the car for their previously mentioned aspiration price.
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Participants were then randomly placed into buyer-seller dyads and provided with a 
‘Negotiation Prices’ form that was pre-formatted so as to enable them to easily keep a 
record, during their negotiation, of: i) every asking/offer-related price that was 
mentioned; ii) the order in which these prices were mentioned; iii) whether it was the 
buyer or seller who had mentioned each price; and: iv) the final, agreed ‘outcome’ 
price at which the car had been sold/purchased. To help standardize the conditions 
faced by all participants the same instructor delivered (from a script) the same 
exercise instructions to each cohort of participants, and the length of time participants 
were given to read their ‘Confidential Information’ handout (40 minutes) and to 
negotiate with each other (50 minutes) was also the same.
Embedded within the handouts each participant received was a variety of 
information designed to encourage an outcome settlement within a £1,500 positive 
and fully overlapping ‘zone of probable agreement’ (ZOPA) that ranged, for the 
buyers and the sellers, from £8,500 to £7,000. That is, £8,500 was the seller’s 
optimum aspiration price and the buyer’s walk-away price, and £7,000 was the 
seller’s walk-away price and the initial boundary point of the buyer’s optimum 
aspiration price. In this paper some of the tests reporting prices announced and all of 
the tests reporting outcomes obtained by the participants studied are expressed as 
SHUFHQWDJHVRIWKLV=23$Į IRUDOOUHSRUWHG significance tests.)
Of course, this exercise-generated £1,500 ZOPA often differed from the actual 
‘bargaining zone’ established by each dyad as a result of the discrepancy between the 
seller’s first orally announced asking price and the buyer’s (invariably lower) first 
announced offer price. Nevertheless, confirmation that the instruction materials for 
this negotiation exercise had successfully influenced participants to orient to this 
ZOPA came from the findings that: i) 562 (86.2%) of the 652 participants’ first prices 
fell within or on the £8,500£7,000 boundary points of this zone; ii) the 90 (13.8%) 
exceptions to this tendency comprised buyers whose first offer price was <£7,000; iii) 
only 9 (2.8%) of the 326 final outcomes were outside this ZOPA; and: iv) all 9 of 
these outcomes were <£7,000, the lowest being £6,500.
2 Intended-Actual First Prices, Negotiation Outcomes and
Negotiation Behavior
Intended first price changing was commonplace in this dataset: the first price 272 
(41.7%) participants actually announced in their negotiation differed from the first 
price they stated they intended to announce. Such price changing took one of two 
possible forms: i) where a participant’s actual first price created a weaker negotiating 
position than what would have been the case if they had announced their intended 
first price—that is, when a buyer’s actual first price was higher than their intended 
first price or a seller’s actual first price was lower than their intended first price (n =
162, 59.6%); or: ii) where a participant’s actual first price created a stronger 
negotiating position than what would have been the case if they had announced their 
intended first price—that is, when a buyer’s actual first price was lower than their 
intended first price or a seller’s actual first price was higher than their intended first 
price) (n = 110, 40.4%).
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These 272 instances of intended-actual first price changing are not likely to have 
been the result of the participants having forgotten the first price they intended to 
ask/offer in their negotiation. Each negotiation had commenced within (at most) ten 
minutes of participants having stated their intended first price and, after completing 
their pre-negotiation questionnaire, participants were not provided with any additional 
information from the exercise instructor that could have influenced their decision to 
change (or to maintain) their intended first price. (The only additional information 
participants were provided with before they commenced their negotiation was the 
identity of the person with whom they would be negotiating.) Furthermore, the size of 
the 272 intended-actual first price discrepancies tended to be quite substantial and, as 
such, they suggested that those participants who had changed their intended first price 
had done so for some perceived to be important, negotiation consequential reason(s). 
The 162 ‘weakeners’ announced a first price that was M = £476.96 weaker than their 
intended first price and the 110 ‘strengtheners’ announced a first price that was M =
£464.48 stronger than their intended first price. By virtue of announcing a different 
first price to their intended first price, weakeners tended to contract what otherwise 
would otherwise have been (i.e., with their intended first price) the bargaining zone 
for their negotiation by M = 63.3% (Mdn = 33.3%) and strengtheners tended to 
expand their bargaining zone by M = 45.9% (Mdn = 34.1%).
Intended first price changing also had an impact on negotiation outcomes. Such
changers tended to obtain a significantly lower percentage of the ZOPA (Mdn =
43.3%) than intended first price maintainers (Mdn = 56.7%): z = -3.70, p < .001, r = -
.15. Maintainers tended to obtain an outcome that was M = 7.1% better than changers.
Moreover: i) changers tended to obtain a worse outcome than maintainers regardless 
of whether their actual first price had been stronger (Mdn = 40.0%) or weaker (Mdn =
45.5%) than their intended first price; and: ii) there was no significant difference 
between the median (or mean) level of the ZOPA obtained by weakeners and 
strengtheners.
Furthermore, intended first price maintaining and changing was a common and 
differentiating feature of the highest and lowest negotiation performers: 70 (76.1%) of 
the highest achieving participants—who each obtained ı80% of the ZOPA in their 
negotiation (n = 92)—did not change their intended first price and only 11 (12.0%) 
weakened their intended first price. In contrast, 41 (44.6%) of the opponents of the 92 
highest achieving participants changed their intended first price and 23 (25.0%) 
weakened their intended first price. In short, the very act of changing their intended 
first price tended to significantly compromise the outcome that participants 
obtained—and it did so irrespective of whether such changing involved strengthening 
or weakening their intended first negotiating position.
One reason for the aforementioned general discrepancies in negotiation outcomes 
is that the first announced prices of changers, maintainers, strengtheners and 
weakeners tended to differ from one another. Changers tended to announce a first 
price that asked for/offered a significantly smaller percentage of the ZOPA (Mdn =
97.2%) than maintainers (Mdn = 100.0%): z = -6.82, p < .001, r = -.27, and weakeners 
tended to announce a first price that asked for/offered the least of all (Mdn = 96.5%). 
Pairwise Mann-Whitney U tests indicated that the median first prices of these groups 
were all significantly different from one another.
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Intended first price changers, maintainers, weakeners and strengtheners also 
differed in their negotiation behavior after their exchange of first prices. Here, the 
total sum conceded (i.e., the difference between each participant’s first price and their 
final agreed sale/purchase outcome price) was analysed. This is because the level of 
concessions a person gives up during a negotiation commonly comprises the most
economically consequential way in which first asking/offer prices are then
transformed into negotiation outcomes [e.g., 5]. Contrary to expectations, changers 
tended to concede a significantly smaller percentage of the ZOPA (Mdn = 33.3%)
than maintainers (Mdn = 33.3%), and weakeners tended to concede the least (Mdn =
26.7%), whereas strengtheners tended to concede the most (Mdn = 51.2%).
In discovering these findings our study then sought to determine, via a series of 
binary logistic regression tests, the following three things: i) which factors may have 
influenced participants to change, maintain, weaken or strengthen their intended first 
price; ii) when any such ‘change of mind’ may have taken place; and: iii) the relative 
level of influence of those factors that had a significant impact on participants’
decisions to change, maintain, weaken or strengthen their intended first price.
3 Logistic Regression Tests
The first three binary logistic regression tests compared the following participant 
groups: i) ‘Weakeners’ vs. ‘Others’; ii) ‘Maintainers vs. ‘Others’; and: iii) 
‘Strengtheners’ vs. ‘Others’ (see Fig. 1, i-iii). In order to obtain final (‘most efficient’)
models that captured the key predictive characteristics of the different participant
groups studied, a series of preliminary univariate tests involving 21 independent 
variables and a total of 28 ‘predictors’ were conducted between the different groups
compared. Figure 1 presents the 21 predictor variables employed in these tests.
Fig. 1. Potential ‘Predictor’ Variables (n = 21) Employed in the Logistic Regression Tests
Those predictors that were not statistically significant in both the univariate (Mann-
Whitney U and Chi-square) tests and the logistic regression ‘baseline’ models were 
taken out of the equation for each test via an iterative process of backward 
elimination. That is, the independent variable with the lowest Wald score and the 
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highest non-significant p value had the highest priority to be removed from the 
model’s equation [6]. Whilst doing this, any change in each model’s overall accuracy 
rate as a result of the elimination of a particular non-significant variable was noted. If 
the model’s overall prediction accuracy rate dropped by more than ten percent as a 
result of omitting such a variable it would be put back into the equation and treated as 
a confounder [6]. This process allows researchers to decide whether a particular, non-
significant variable’s effect is spurious or whether it has a unique predictive 
effect/influence on one or more of the other independent variables that remain in the 
final model, even though it may not be a significant predictor on its own. However, 
there were no such confounders in the final models; the highest level of influence of 
the non-significant predictors omitted from the final models compiled was 0.1%.
All three final models showed a significant improvement (at the p < .001 level) 
over the ‘intercept only’ for each model. Sensitivity ranged from 54.5% (with 
strengtheners as the reference group) to 81.6% (with maintainers as the reference 
group). The R2N of these models ranged from .49 to .55—indicating, for all three 
models—a ‘medium’ relationship between prediction and grouping. ROC tests 
revealed AUCs ranging from .86 (indicating the model was likely to have a ‘good’ 
ability to distinguish between the designated reference group and the other 
participants) to .92 (indicating the model was likely to have an ‘excellent’ 
distinguishing ability). All three final models had an EPV (Events Per Variable) >10. 
There were no collinearity, outlier or influential case issues in each final model.
Weakeners, when compared with the other participants, were significantly more 
likely to: i) be sellers (OR = 2.3); to have: ii) a weaker aspiration price (OR = 1.02); 
iii) a fairest price more favourable to themselves rather than to their opponent (OR =
1.002); iv) a stronger intended first price (OR = 1.03); v) a medium or high (rather 
than a low) level of difference between their fairest and intended first price (ORs = 
2.7 and 2.7 respectively); vi) a high (rather than a medium) level of difference 
between their walk-away and intended first price (OR = 2.1); vii) to not be the first 
price announcer in their negotiation (OR = 2.4); viii) to have their intended and/or 
their actual first price inside the ZOPA (OR = 33.3); and: ix) to give up more of the 
ZOPA with their first price (OR = 1.05). All other predictor variables were not 
significant.
Maintainers, when compared with the other participants, were significantly more 
likely to: i) be sellers (OR = 3.2); ii) not be of Indian nationality (OR = 2.13); to have: 
iii) a medium (rather than a low) level of difference between their fairest and intended 
first price (OR = 1.9); iv) a medium (rather than a high) level of difference between 
their walk-away and intended first price (OR = 4.5); to be: v) the first price announcer 
in their negotiation (OR = 1.8); to have: vi) both their intended and actual first price 
outside the ZOPA (OR = 77.0); and: vii) to give up more of the ZOPA with their first 
price (OR = 1.04). All other predictor variables were not significant.
Strengtheners, when compared with the other participants, were significantly more 
likely to: i) be buyers (OR = 14.7); to have: ii) a stronger aspiration price (OR = 
1.02); iii) a fairest price more favourable to their opponent (OR = 1.001); iv) a weaker 
intended first price (OR = 1.06); v) a low (rather than a medium) level of difference 
between their fairest and intended first price (OR = 6.2); vi) their intended and/or their 
actual first price inside the ZOPA (OR = 10.5); and: vii) to give up less of the ZOPA 
with their first price (OR = 1.12). All other predictor variables were not significant.
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A further series of three binary logistic regression tests were then conducted. Here,
weakeners, maintainers and strengtheners were compared with one another as 
individual groups (see Fig. 1, iv-vi). All three of these final models showed a 
significant improvement (at the p < .001 level) over the ‘intercept only’ for each 
model. Sensitivity ranged from 57.3% (in the strengtheners vs. maintainers test) to 
95.1% (in the weakeners vs. strengtheners). The R2N of these models was .82
(weakeners vs. strengtheners test), .55 (weakeners vs. maintainers), and .51
(strengtheners vs. maintainers), indicating, respectively, a ‘good, ‘medium’ and 
‘medium’ relationship between prediction and grouping. ROC tests revealed AUCs of 
.97, .90, and .88 respectively, indicating that the models were likely to have an 
‘excellent’, excellent and ‘good’ ability to distinguish between the designated 
reference group and the other, compared participant group. All three final models had 
an EPV >10. Again, there were no collinearity, outlier or influential case issues in 
each final model.
Weakeners, when compared with strengtheners, were significantly more likely to: 
i) be sellers (OR = 6.1); to have: ii) a weaker aspiration price (OR = 1.06); iii) a 
fairest price more favourable to themselves (OR = 1.01); iv) a stronger intended first 
price (OR = 1.15); v) a medium or high (rather than a low) difference between their 
fairest and intended first price (ORs = 7.5 and 11.5 respectively); vi) their intended 
and/or their actual first price inside the ZOPA (OR = 250); and: vii) to give up more 
of the ZOPA with their first price (OR = 1.21). All other predictor variables were not 
significant.
Weakeners, when compared with maintainers, were significantly more likely to 
have: i) a weaker aspiration price (OR = 1.02); ii) a fairest price more favourable to 
themselves (OR = 1.001); iii) a stronger intended first price (OR = 1.03); iv) a high 
(rather than a medium) level of difference between their walk-away and intended first 
price (OR = 3.9); to: v) not be the first price announcer in their negotiation (OR = 
2.5); and: vi) to have their intended and/or their actual first price inside the ZOPA 
(OR = 83.3). All other predictor variables were not significant.
Strengtheners, when compared with maintainers, were significantly more likely to: 
i) be buyers (OR = 12.6); to have: ii) a stronger aspiration price (OR = 1.02); iii) a 
weaker intended first price (OR = 1.04); iv) a low (rather than a medium) level of 
difference between their fairest and intended first price (OR = 5.0); v) their intended 
and/or their actual first price inside the ZOPA (OR = 27.0); and: vi) to give up less of 
the ZOPA with their first price (OR = 1.10). All other predictor variables were not 
significant.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This study found that negotiators who maintain, change, strengthen or weaken their 
intended first asking/offer price comprise persons who have significantly different 
identities and pre-negotiation perceptions who engage in systematically different 
forms of negotiation behavior and tend, as a consequence, to secure different 
negotiation outcomes. Almost all the evident outcome-compromising ‘damage’ that 
intended first price changers engaged in tended to occur at the very beginning of their 
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negotiation and was the result of the relatively weaker or stronger first asking/offer 
price they tended to announce compared to intended first price maintainers. 
Generally, post-first asking/offer price behavior—in the form of the level of 
concessions the participants subsequently made during their negotiation—did not 
have the same level of influence on negotiation outcomes.
In addition, whilst a number of personal identity and ‘opponent determinable’ 
factors (such as buyer/seller role played, participant nationality, opponent nationality 
and relative age difference) occasionally were also significantly related to the type of 
first asking/offer price the participants announced, it was the pre-negotiation price-
related variables (and their relationship with other price-related variables) that
generally had the highest level of impact on: i) whether a participant’s first announced 
price was weaker, stronger or the same as their intended first price; and: ii) how 
strong or weak the intended first asking/offer price they announced tended to be.  
But why did so many participants change their intended first price and announce a 
stronger or weaker first asking/offer price? The most plausible reason seems to be 
some form of uncertainty—for instance, that intended first price changers were, in 
some way, relatively less sure than maintainers about some aspect(s) of the task that 
lay ahead of them and/or their ability to perform successfully during their negotiation. 
This general uncertainty appears, primarily, to derive from a combination of 
misplaced participant perceptions that were allied to an even lower level of 
negotiation skill than what was typically the case for the higher performing 
participants in the dataset studied. Certainly, the type of intended first price changing
that many of the participants engaged in tended to tell us more about the changers 
themselves than it did about their particular opponents.
These findings have a number of implications for negotiation researchers. In 
particular, by omitting to take intended first prices into account in the analysis of any
form of price-related negotiation behavior, researchers are likely to seriously 
compromise their ability to accurately understand not only the particular type of 
negotiation conduct they are examining but also other directly and indirectly related 
negotiation processes more generally. For example, although many studies have 
shown that first announced asking/offer prices have a major ‘anchoring effect’ impact 
on negotiation outcomes [e.g., 5, 7-13], very little of this research appears to have 
recognized that the first asking/offer price a person actually does announce during 
their negotiation may have been different to and (even more importantly) significantly 
influenced by the first price they intended to announce.
Finally, this paper has explored a ‘hidden’ process that has an evident and 
significant impact on both the course that a negotiation takes as well as its outcome. 
Whether a negotiator changes his or her intended first price and/or announces a first 
price that is stronger than, weaker than or the same as his/her intended price is not 
something that ordinarily is publicly expressed by a negotiator; nor is it something a 
negotiator can readily determine from their opponent’s first announced price. 
Nevertheless, this study has indicated that such important yet hitherto under-
researched and privately held factors can actually be located and formally examined 
by researchers and, moreover, that their impact on negotiation behavior and outcomes 
can be determined and explicated in some detail.
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Abstract. Sound decision making rests on a thorough understanding of the 
objectives that should be achieved. The process of generating or identifying and 
then selecting and agreeing on a set of decision objectives is shaped by 
individual capacities and social interaction. The structuring process is decisive 
in framing the decision and discussion. This is critical in decisions around
public infrastructure where decision makers, stakeholders, and implementing 
organizations coincide only partially. With this research we aim at investigating
the structuring of objectives for real-world decisions on wastewater 
infrastructure. We explore breadth and depth of objectives’ generation,
procedures and criteria for selection and reduction of a set of objectives, and
how both can be related to an explanatory model of such a process.
Keywords: multicriteria decision making, decision objectives, structuring 
process, multi-organization, public infrastructure, wastewater
1   Introduction and theoretical background
Rational decision making is based on objectives that should be achieved [e.g., 1].
These decision objectives are generated, formulated, structured, and refined in a 
process that is often iterative. As the objectives define the content of the evaluation, 
analysis, and also discussion around decision alternatives, different sets of objectives 
potentially lead to different decision outcomes [2].
The process of eliciting and structuring objectives, while often considered “more of 
an art than a science” [3], will influence the set of objectives the decision makers will 
end up with. In group decisions, this process is inherently a social process, subject to 
interpretation and negotiation [e.g., 4]. Both, the decision analyst or facilitator and the 
participants will shape this process to varying degrees, depending, e.g., on roles and 
personalities of those involved, institutional boundaries, and case characteristics.
Several approaches and methods have been developed to bring some rigor and 
clarity to this “art” [e.g., 5]. Particularly in problem structuring methods decision 
objectives are often identified at some point in the process [6, 7]. Bond et al. [8, 9]
have found empirical evidence that decision makers are unable to specify all 
objectives they consider relevant for their decision and provide some 
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recommendations for supporting objectives’ generation. However, guidance on the 
process of structuring objectives is still limited [e.g., 10, 11].
Every objectives structuring process will be unique. However, there are common 
characteristics, which can be abstracted to a model or a more general theory of this 
process. The process of starting with a unclear collection of concerns to arriving at a 
concise objectives hierarchy, can be described as consisting of a phase of “opening 
up” and “closing down” [cf. 12], or a diverging and a converging phase [13]. This 
description can also be useful from a prescriptive standpoint, as the opening up phase 
calls for consideration of a range of objectives and alternatives while the closing 
down phase brings the decision problem into a form that can be solved by decision 
analysis procedures. While valuable as a high-level description of the structuring 
process, this model is quite limited for explaining the process and patterns that occur 
within.
In the process research literature more general archetypes or models of processes 
are discussed [14]. Transferring these ideas to the objectives structuring process, a
compelling proposition for an explanatory model could lie in an evolutionary theory 
of process [15]. It is based on an analogy of biological evolution to an evolution of 
ideas [16]. This theory explains process as interplay between mechanisms of 
variation, selection, and retention. In objectives structuring we may consider variation 
of objectives as starting point, followed by a selection through different mechanisms, 
and a retention of those objectives that prove fit or useful in some sense. This process 
explanation adds detail to the two-phase model introduced above.
Where water and wastewater services are provided by a public provider, decisions 
in urban water management are public decisions, as they affect the whole population. 
These decisions are traditionally technocratic and solved by engineering companies
by optimizing cost under constraints of thresholds given by law. However, there is 
growing interest in breaking up this technocratic paradigm and promoting more 
holistic and also multi-criteria approaches to decision making [e.g., 17, 18].
Such public infrastructure decisions are an interesting study case to investigate the 
topic of objectives structuring. Here, the group of stakeholders or problem owners 
may be much larger than the group of decision makers and not necessarily overlap. 
This requires an even more careful structuring process, as decision makers not only 
need to consider their personal or organizational objectives, but also those of third 
parties (e.g., citizens, future generations).
2 Research topic
The aim of this research is to explore the objectives structuring phase for public 
wastewater infrastructure decisions with the purpose of contributing to better 
practices in this field. The research will investigate five propositions that were derived
from previous work and theory. In the following the propositions are first listed and 
then briefly motivated.
1.) When unaided, decision makers will identify decision objectives that are 
variations of the same few themes or categories, thereby neglecting less 
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salient decision dimensions. They are unable to generate all decision 
objectives they consider to be of relevance.
2.) Intervention by the decision analyst can lead to a more comprehensive and 
deliberate objectives set.
3.) When faced with the need to reduce this set to the most relevant objectives, 
decision makers revert to objectives they had in mind first, not considering 
less common problem dimensions.
4.) Intervention by the decision analyst can lead to a more deliberate selection 
process which favors a broader perspective on the decision.
5.) Considering objectives structuring in terms of an evolutionary process, can 
be helpful in explaining propositions 1-4.
Propositions 1 and 2 have been investigated in similar form by Bond et al. [8, 9]
who found that decision makers indeed have trouble articulating all objectives they 
consider important when unaided, but can improve with aid [8]. We will explore 
whether this pattern also can be seen in real-world cases of public decision-making. 
Here, it is of special interest, in how far objectives of less salient decision dimensions 
and objectives of the wider public are taken into account by their representatives.
Propositions 3 and 4 are based on the ideas of “anchoring” [19] on a psychological 
side as well as “lock-in” [e.g., 20] or “crisis of innovation” [21] on a socio-
technological side. While acknowledging that transition processes in infrastructure 
systems are a highly complex interplay of factors and forces, a narrow consideration 
of objectives in decision making contributes to perpetuate “business as usual”, even 
though other solutions may outperform traditional approaches [22].
The proposition of an evolutionary process model is based on previous studies on 
objectives structuring in this context [17] and first observations in the case studies. 
Objectives that are initially brought forward in these cases are for the most part small 
variations of common themes (e.g. economic feasibility). The decision analyst may 
try to increase this variation by introducing other themes (e.g. resource recovery). The 
subsequent selection process may sort out those objectives that do not “fit” to the 
decision problem. This can be for practical reasons, e.g. they do not help distinguish 
between alternatives, but also other reasons, such as political ones. Objectives that are 
in some sense useful will be retained. In an iterative structuring process several such 
evolutionary cycles can occur. It will be determined how far this model is suitable for 
explaining the empirical findings, or if they lend themselves to a different 
explanation.
Independent of the empirical evidence turning out to be consistent or inconsistent 
with these propositions, they serve as guideposts for a better understanding of the 
objectives structuring process. On the empirical side, we gain insight into the 
capabilities of decision makers to generating and selecting objectives for public 
decisions with and without support. On the practical side, we hope the findings will 
support consultants to build useful and valid objectives hierarchies for wastewater 
infrastructure decisions. The experiences can result in recommendations on how such 
a process may be designed for decisions of similar nature. On the theoretical side, 
empirically grounding a model of an evolutionary process of objectives structuring 
may enrich the common model of a two-phase structuring process and thus allow new 
questions and insights in the objective structuring phase in the future.
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3 Research approach and methods
The research is conducted in the context of three real-world decision cases 
concerning mergers of wastewater treatment plants in Switzerland (i.e. instead of 
operating several wastewater treatment plants in a region, all wastewater would be 
routed to one, possibly newly built, treatment plant). Mergers of technical 
infrastructure usually involve several organizational bodies which create a planning 
committee, leading to multi-organizational group decision processes. If the planning 
committee finds agreement, in Switzerland these decisions have to be approved by the 
citizens of the involved municipalities, typically by public vote. Usually, an 
engineering consultant leads the decision process and provides technical expertise and 
predictions on the performance of different alternatives. The research team is 
involved in the cases to different degrees. It is present at meetings, can ask 
stakeholders for participation in research, and can provide input, but has little control 
over the decision process itself.
3.2   Case study research
All decision cases concern the same decision topic, but differ considerably in 
decision processes, type and number of involved actors, institutional arrangements, 
local challenges, and thus in the concrete decision problem.
The unit of analysis for some of the research questions are the individual actors. 
For these, the case studies represent different contexts that allow differentiation of
context-dependent and independent patterns. A second layer of analysis is a cross-
case comparison where we can compare outcomes (e.g. objectives hierarchies) and 
processes between the three cases. This allows exploring differences and similarities 
between cases.
3.3   Data collection and analysis
Due to external constraints in the cases the data collection will differ slightly. 
However, the main data collection activities are similar.
One stream of data concerns the set of objectives of each individual participant. 
Participants are individually asked to come up with objectives and, subsequently, to 
reconsider and complement their objectives for example with the help of a “master 
list” [see 9]. In addition, they are asked to sort and rank objectives (e.g., assigning 
categories of perceived importance). Elicitation of objectives is planned twice. First,
early in the problem structuring phase, and then after a decision model has been 
formulated, i.e., when preference elicitation interviews take place. For the first 
elicitation we will employ an online survey. The second elicitation would take place 
in personal interviews, where survey information can be enriched by reasoning and 
explanation of the participants. For confidentiality reasons we are likely restricted to 
members in the planning committees, which are about 10–15 per case study.
The second stream of data is gathered in group meetings. Group meetings are 
recorded where possible. Depending on the case, decision objectives are also 
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collected, discussed, and selected in group meetings under the lead of the engineering 
consultants with input by the research team. This results in a second collection of sets 
of objectives at different time points in the decision. In addition the discussions 
around the objectives provide a qualitative account of positions, views, and concerns 
of the different parties.
The most important unit of data are the sets of objectives provided by different 
actors at different time points, as well as ordinal data on rankings and perceived 
importance of objectives. Partly, these will need to be interpreted by the researcher
team to homogenize phrasing, but can be regarded as quantitative data sources. 
Accordingly, they can be examined by descriptive statistics and, depending on sample 
size, inferential statistics can be applied to test hypotheses derived from the 
aforementioned propositions. In addition to a generalization via statistics, one line of 
reasoning will be to generalize the findings to existing theory. We have not decided 
on a way to investigate and integrate the qualitative data, yet.
4 Overview over schedule and state
The three real world cases we have negotiated access to are all in early phases of 
the decision-making process. We have been present at several committee meetings 
and data on a group brainstorming of objectives has been collected in one case 
(recording of discussion and collected objectives). The first individual survey of 
actors’ objectives is planned for July to September 2017. Discussion of objectives in 
the planning committee is scheduled for August in one case but not clear for the 
others, yet. The second round of objectives’ elicitation would be coupled to 
preference elicitation interviews for a multi-criteria decision model. This requires an 
agreed upon model structure and predictions about alternatives’ impacts and will be 
scheduled contingent on this.
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Industry 4.0 - Towards Automated Supply Chain 
Formation
Florina Livia Covaci
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Abstract. In the vision of Industry 4.0, most enterprise processes must become 
more digitized. A critical element will be the evolution of traditional supply 
chains toward a connected, smart, and highly efficient supply chain ecosystem. 
This ecosystem will enable companies to react to disruptions in the supply chain 
and adjust the supply chain in real time as conditions change. Algorithms will 
enable machines to make autonomous decisions in the digitized supply chain of 
the future. The current research focuses on contract negotiation in a digital supply 
chain formation environment by mapping the problem in terms of a directed 
acyclic graph where the nodes are represented by the suppliers/consumers acted 
by agents. Communication between agents along the supply chain is done by 
message exchange and provides support for negotiation of contract constraints 
along the network.
Keywords: Supply Chain Formation, Agent-based negotiation, Digital 
Manufacturing, Contract Negotiation, Decision Support
1 Motivation
The dynamic of supply networks that Industry 4.0 promises requires new 
mechanisms for negotiation of contracts with upstream and contracted suppliers. The 
supply chain formation process will undergo an organizational change mainly with 
respect to the connecting production facilities across geographies and company 
boundaries and will create new business models and disrupt current supply chain 
designs. 
The current work considers the problem of supply chain formation as a form of 
coordinated commercial interaction.  The considered supply chain scenario represents 
a network of production and exchange relationships that spans multiple levels of 
production or task decomposition. This supply chain model is typically used in 
manufacturing industries that produce complex goods (planes, cars etc.) but any service 
or contracting relationship that spans multiple levels can be mapped to this supply chain
scenario. The current work translates the Supply Chain Formation problem in terms of 
a directed acyclic graph where the nodes are represented by the agents.
The agents are characterized in terms of their capabilities to perform tasks, and their 
interests in having tasks accomplished. A central feature in the considered scenario is 
hierarchical task decomposition: in order to perform a particular task, an agent may 
need to achieve some subtasks, which may be delegated to other agents. These may in 
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turn have subtasks that may be delegated, forming a supply chain through a 
decomposition of task achievement. Constraints on the task assignment arise from the 
underling suppliers’ network as exemplified in Figure 1
Fig. 1 Example of supply chain with hierarchical task decomposition
The final product owner X1 at the root of the supply chain can chose among X2, X3,
X4 and X8 sub-assembly suppliers. The length of the four possible supply chains is 
different because there may be 1st tier suppliers that are able to produce the sub 
assembly without further task decomposition. At lower levels a certain subassembly 
supplier or a certain part supplier has the option of choosing among multiple possible 
descendant suppliers. For example X3 may chose X6 or X11 as his fabricated part 
supplier and X5 may choose between X7 and X12 as raw material suppliers.
Research aims: providing support for negotiation and for linking end-consumer 
requirements to underlying suppliers to conjointly guarantee end-to-end agreed contract 
parameters. 
Research challenges:
1. The contracts between partners in the supply chain involve multiple issues (cost, 
time of delivery, quality constraints, penalties etc.), that the involved entities are 
negotiating on. These give raise to different utility values for a contract of the 
participating agents, according to their preferences. 
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2. In a SCF process, an entity can be both a supplier and a consumer in different 
negotiation contexts at the same time. The dual role of a participant in the SCF 
complicates the negotiation scenarios. In particular, a participant has to confirm that its 
own suppliers can support the issues it negotiates with its consumer, before it commits 
to his own contract as a supplier.
2 Theoretical Foundations
The Supply Chain Formation (SCF) problem has been widely studied by the multi-
agent systems community. Numerous contributions can be found in the literature where 
participants are represented by computational agents [2],[6],[3],[7]. These 
computational agents act in behalf of the participants during the SCF process. By 
employing computational agents it is possible to form SCs in a fraction of the time 
required by the manual approach [8]. The existing literature on SCF uses two 
approaches: the first one is modeling the supply chain as a network of auctions, with 
first and second-price sealed bid auctions, double auctions and combinatorial auctions 
among the most frequently-used methods [1],[2]. In the past years another type of 
approaches were proposed. These approaches make use of graphical models and 
inference algorithms to tackle SCF and related problems [4],[6],[7],[8].
2.1 Max-sum
Max-sum [9] is a message passing algorithm that provides approximate solutions for 
the problem of maximizing a function that decomposes additively in three steps. First, 
it maps the problem into a structure called local term graph. Then it iteratively changes 
messages between vertexes of that graph. Each vertex of the local term graph is in 
charge of receiving messages from its neighbors, composing new messages and sending 
them to its neighbors. Finally, it determines the states of the variables.
2.2 Loopy Belief Propagation(LBP)
LBP is the first peer to peer approach that has been used to solve the SCF problem in a 
decentralized manner[4],[5],[7],[10]. In [5], an LBP-based approach was applied to the 
SCF problem, noting that the passing of messages in LBP is comparable to the placing 
of bids in standard auction-based approaches. The work in [4] shows that the SCF 
problem can be cast as an optimization problem that can be efficiently approximated 
using max-sum algorithm [9] presented in the section above. Thus, the authors offer the 
means of converting a SCF problem into a local term graph, on which max-sum can 
operate.
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3.3 Reduced Binarized Loopy Belief Propagation (RB-LBP)
As LBP suffers from scalability issues in [6] the authors introduce the Reduced 
Binarized Loopy Belief Propagation algorithm (RB-LBP). RB-LBP is based on the 
max-sum algorithm and simplifies the calculation of max-sum messages through 
careful analysis of its local terms. The variables are binary which simplifies the supply 
chain formation process and each buy and sell decision is decoupled, encoded in a 
different variable, from the rest of buy and sell decisions. By decoupling these decisions 
the algorithm is able to reduce the number of combinations to take into account.
3 Research approach and preliminary results
Multi-agent systems enable the modelling of supply chain formation (SCF) using self-
interested agents for decentralized decision making and the process of information 
propagation across the whole network. The current paper uses the max-sum algorithm 
mechanism of passing messages for the values of the issues that the agents are 
negotiating on, the agents having an exact way to estimate the utility they get, by 
making use of utility functions. The agreed values of the negotiated issues are reflected 
in a contract which has a certain utility value for every agent. By using utility functions, 
they can assess the benefits they would gain from a given contract, and compare them 
with their own expectations in order to make decisions. During the SCF process the 
messages are passed between a consumer and its suppliers. Agents send messages 
regarding multiple contract issues: cost, time of delivery, quality indicators, delay 
penalties etc.
The following paragraph provides a formal description of the supply chain formation 
problem in terms of a directed, acyclic graph (X, E) where X = {X1, X2, ..., Xn} denote 
set of participants in the supply chain represented by agents and a set of edges E
connecting agents that might buy or sell from another.
The agents negotiate on multiple contract paUDPHWHUVDQGQHJRWLDWLRQ¿QLVKHVZLWKD
contract that is composed of the actual values of the issues that they have agreed on. 
Notation vi represents the expectation of a participant in the supply chain on issue i of 
the contract and U(v) the utility that a participant obtains by receiving the actual value 
v =(vi1 ,vi2 , ..., vik ).When a supplier (seller) negotiates with a consumer (buyer), both
parties are interested in obtaining those contract values v =(vi1 ,vi2 , ..., vik ) that 
maximize their utility functions U(v) . This means that during the negotiation, the agent 
sends a messages to its neighbors regarding the states of his variables that is maximizing 
its utility function. 
The utility functions U(v) will be calculated by means of weighted sum as follows: 
ܷ(ݒ) = σ ݓ௜ כ ݒ௜  , ݓ݅ݐ݄ σ ݓ௜௞௜ୀଵ௞௜ୀଵ = 1 (1)
where 0 <= wi<= 1 represent the weights measuring the importance of a given issue i
for a certain agent in the chain.
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The agents don’t know each other utility functions, they are aware only of the values 
of the discrete states variables they share. Each agent interacts with its neighbors agents 
such that the utility of an individual agent U(v), is dependent on its own state and the 
states of these other agents.
6ROYLQJ WKH SUREOHP VWDWHG DERYH SURYLGHV PHDQV IRU ¿QGLQJ DQ DOORFDWLRQ WKDW
maximize each agent utility in the supply chain within the underlying partners’
constraints. 
An allocation is a sub-graph (X',E') ك (X, E). For Xi, Xj א V ', an edge between Xi,
Xj means that agent Xj provides goods to agent Xi. An agent is in an allocation graph if 
it acquires or provides goods. 
In the graph in Figure 2 each node represents a participant in the supply chain. Each 
two nodes share at least one issue that they must agree on, and the value that they have 
agreed on, must be propagated from the underlying suppliers to the upper level of the 
supply chain. Figure 3 shows how the message is send between node X1 and X2 and 
back, when the agents have to agree on the issue B of a potential contract.
Fig. 3 Messages sent from X1 to X2 and back when they negotiate on issue B
Fig. 2 Example of supply chain with agents sharing state variables
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By sending the message in equation (2), X1 says to X2 which is his preferred value 
from the set of values for issue B. 
ɉଵ՜ଶ(ܤ) = ݉ܽݔ஻(ܷ൫ ௝ܾ , ܿ௞൯ +݉ܽݔ஺ ቀܷ൫ܽ௜ , ௝ܾ൯ቁ) (2)
X1 sends the max-marginalization of B over A ( maxA(U(ai,bj ) ) and then adds the 
computed utility of agent X2 and then computes the max marginalization of B over the 
above terms.
Agent at node X2 evaluates using his utility function, the utility that he gets for each 
combination of values from the set of values for issues B and C. X2 send to X1 the 
message in equation (3), which is his preferred value from the set of values for issue B. 
X2 sends the max-marginalization of B over C (maxC (U(bj ,ck) ) and then adds the 
computed value for utility of agent X1 and then computes the max marginalization of 
B over the above terms. 
ɉଶ՜ଵ(ܤ) = ݉ܽݔ஻(ܷ൫ܽ௜ , ௝ܾ൯ +݉ܽݔ஼ ቀܷ൫ ௝ܾ , ܿ௞൯ቁ) (3)
The messages are scheduled starting from leaves and then are propagated upward 
towards the root. 
4 Experimental Evaluation 
In order to validate the proposed model in section 2, PeerSim simulator was 
selected. The reasons for making this choice are the PeerSim performance regarding 
scalability and because it is based on components that allows prototyping a new 
protocol, combining diᚎHUHQWSOXJJDEOHEXLOGLQJEORFNV>@
Fig. 4 Initial random states for variables time and cost
The network used for the current simulation has 18 nodes and each node has three 
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possible partners that he can trade with. The initial random states for variable time and 
cost are presented in Figure 4. Each node v has a vector of numeric values that are the 
preferred states of the negotiated issues. The considered issues for negotiation over the 
supply chain are: delivery time and cost. The delivery time is measured in months and 
the cost is measured in the amount of money spent and it has been divided by 100 for 
the simplicity of the illustration of the values obtained. Also each node owns a utility 
function which is computed as a weighted sum from each of the issues that the agents 
in the supply chain are discussing on. 
At the beginning of the simulation all the agents in the network are being initialized 
with random preferred values for the states variables and also for the weights used at 
computing every agent utility. Each node that is not a leaf is receiving messages from 
its neighbors, composing new messages and sending them upward to its neighbors. 
Each node will assess messages received from the corresponding neighbor according 
to his own utility function and will chose among all the possible partners the one that 
maximizes his utility function. Note that there are agents whose utility remain 0 after 
running the protocol because they remain inactive during the supply chain formation 
process. The final states of the variables and utility obtained by each agent are 
illustrated in Figure 5.
Fig. 5 Final states for variables time and cost and utility obtained by each agent
There are three possible allocation sub-graphs, illustrated in Figure 6. 7KH ¿UVW
VROXWLRQWKDWWKHLPSOHPHQWHGSURWRFRO¿QGVLVWKHDOORFDWLRQVXE-graph being formed 
of the following nodes {X11,X3,X0}and the utility that the end-consumer gets is 16.64 
with the states of the variables being propagated to the root (t=2;c=48) 
7KHVHFRQGVROXWLRQWKDWWKHLPSOHPHQWHGSURWRFRO¿QGVLVWKHDOORFDWLRQVXE-graph 
being formed of the following nodes {X6,X1,X0} and the utility that the end-consumer 
gets is 19.14 with the states of the variables being propagated to the root (t=1;c=58).
The propagation of the states of the variables for agent X2 has two phases: in phase 
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1 the agent X2 chooses X9 DVDSDUWQHUDVLW¿QGVWKDWWKHXWLOLW\WKDWKHJHWVLVKLJKHU
than the previous one but in phase 2 the agent chooses agent X8 as he gets an even 
higher utility that the one provided be agent X9. The delivery time is shorter and the 
cost is higher than the ones at the allocation in solution 1 and according to the utility 
function of the agent at node X0 it provides a higher utility. The agent gets a higher 
utility if the required component is provided in shorter time event it costs more. 
Fig. 6 Possible allocations
7KHWKLUGVROXWLRQWKDWWKHLPSOHPHQWHGSURWRFRO¿QGVLVWKHDOORFDWLRQVXE-graph is 
being formed of the following nodes {X8, X2, X0} using the propagation at the previous 
solution it propagates further the states of agent X2 to the root and the utility that the 
end-consumer gets is 20.15 with the values states of the variables (t=3; c=14). The 
delivery time is longer but the cost is much lower that the allocation at solution 2 and 
according to the utility function of the agent at node X0 it provides the maximum utility. 
5 Reflections
As opposed to the previous decentralized approaches, the current approach 
incorporates multiple negotiated issues and uses utility functions in order to compute
and maximize utility in the supply chain. The current approach that this work presents 
uses message passing between agents during the supply chain formation process and is 
closer to real life scenarios than the previous approaches that were using only cost as a 
mean for pairwise agents.
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Abstract. The problem of negotiation in ill structured group decision problems 
is considered. An approach to solve such problems is proposed for the cases with 
the lack of measurable information related to a problem. The approach 
recommends insight-oriented intuition to apply. The proposal presents a research 
frame which allows to tackle issue of identification of reliable intuition 
occurrence and the problem of measurability of potential of intuition of 
a negotiation player. The proposal addresses the issue of implementation of 
intuition into negotiation process. The preliminary research results indicate that 
reliable intuition can be identified and the measurement of potential of intuition 
is feasible, at least in laboratory conditions. Further studies within this concept 
are discussed.
Keywords: negotiation strategy, intuition, leap of faith, insight, experts, 
decision-making, problem-solving
1   Introduction
The technological breakthrough in the processing of information on the one hand and 
the globalization of transactions as well as the integration of economic systems on the 
other hand, has led to groundbreaking complications in the negotiations aimed at 
agreeing contracts. New features of current and future negotiation situations include: 
changing complexity of the surrounding environment, changing scale of intercultural 
interactions, and changing pace of the environment. The market must presently function 
in conditions where the number of factors and complexity increase and the process of 
modeling decision problems and correcting procedures do not the keep up with the flow 
of incoming information [1]. In effect of this civilization breakthrough, ill structured 
negotiation situations are increasingly occurring requiring decision-making based on 
intuition. Thus, there exist a necessity to rethink the classical methods of carrying out 
business transactions for ill structured negotiation problems.
Works dealing with the methodology of this field of science, underline a need to 
conduct basic research devoted to including unmeasurable, subjective factors and 
information gaps in decision-making analysis. Druckman [2] indicates this area as an 
important research development direction. He states the moment to undertake the issues 
happening “at the negotiating table, around the table, and away from the table” in 
situations when missing data preclude explicit analysis. 
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Negotiation is a strategy that is utilized when different or even contradicting interests 
of two parties occur. Both parties are interdependent to the extent an agreement would 
be mutually beneficial [3]. Negotiation situation in characterized with incomplete 
information parties possess on themselves [4]. That is why progressing the process of 
negotiation might be very difficult.  
Intuition is found to be a helpful mechanism to support decision-making in ill structured 
situations and lack of measurable information related to the problem [5]. However, 
there are studies that show intuition could be misleading [6]. A frequent lack of ability 
to justify the source of intuition makes intuition a problematic element of decision-
making process [7]. However, what if unsupported intuition could lead to explicitly 
supported insight?
Intuition is defined as “affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid non-
conscious and holistic associations” [8] whereas insight is perceived to be "sudden 
unexpected thoughts that solve problems" [9]. In the paper, this definition is clarified 
and made more precise: insight results from knowledge, experience and the right 
judgment about problem and its causes, it occurs in form of sudden unexpected thoughts 
that solve problems due to enabling deliberate justification of solution. In other words, 
intuition may provide solution but not necessarily justification for this solution, while 
insight allows to explain why a recommendation solves the problem. Both processes 
appear unexpectedly but, contrary to intuition, insight could be justified with previously 
collected information. Moreover, as intuition communicates its results only in form of 
feelings [10], insight provides solutions that are fully understandable [11]. The above 
mentioned characteristics indicate insight to outperform intuition in the process of 
problem-solving. However, there is no theory that explains what triggers its occurrence. 
While we don’t know what initiates the process of gaining insight, we can’t reliably 
support its occurrence in decision-making process. 
There are no studies indicating that intuition leads to insight. However, there are some 
hypotheses that assume this possibility [12]. One of the reasons that intuition and 
insight were not considered to be interdependent is caused by different scientific fields 
studying those processes [13]. If it will occur that intuition can lead to insight, this 
insight oriented intuition could become a reliable negotiation support in situations 
where missing data preclude explicit analysis.
Another issue concerns individual differences in accuracy of their intuition [14].
Among different factors, experience [15] and individual abilities [16] are found to 
determine accuracy of intuition. That is why, the negotiation process should be 
supported with intuition from participants with its highest potential. Results of previous 
studies provided by the author of the paper, indicated that it is not the preference for 
intuitive over analytical thinking that make people utilize intuition accurately. 
Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 39
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
It’s rather the potential of intuition1 that allows prediction of its reliability in future 
judgments [17]. The problem here concerns the method that would enable intuition 
potential measurement. As there are questionnaires to assess preference for intuitive 
decision-making [18], there are no tools that will allow to predict accuracy of one’s 
intuition. 
2 Research Plans/Methodology
The project aims at a new approach to solve ill structured problems in situations of 
missing measurable information. This approach recommends implementation of 
intuition providing a subject with insight. This goal of the project splits in two parts. 
The first part concerns verification of a significance and interrelation between intuition 
and insight in ill structured decision-making problems. The second part is devoted to a 
construction of a negotiation support procedure which will expand classic methods with 
the concept of intuition. These goals require verification of the following research 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: There exist ill structured negotiation situations when intuition influences 
negotiation process.
Hypothesis 2: There exist ill structured negotiation situations when intuition leads to 
insight.
Hypothesis 3: There exists a measure of players in terms of intuition potential in a class 
of ill structured negotiation situations.
Hypothesis 4: For a class of ill-structured negotiation problems, there exist a 
procedure of negotiation support which increases effectiveness of negotiation due to an 
increase of potential of intuition.
In order to verify previously stated hypotheses, a series of experiments within three 
different studies are planned to be conducted. The studies assume use of a mix of 
methods which enable researcher to confirm her claims on intuitive behaviors. These 
methods involve analysis of results of experiments with (mostly student) subjects. 
Experiments are prepared as negotiation games with real pay-offs. The analysis is to 
take into account changes during the game and games’ process. These changes are 
revealed in descriptions of positions in games (e.g. numbers, written statements of 
position in each round of the game etc.). Also, measurement of unconscious 
physiological reactions during the process reflects changes resulted from solving 
behavior. Consequently, players behaviors will be described twofold. Firstly, the 
natural (words) or formal language (numbers etc.) describes subject of negotiation. 
Secondly, as far as internal players’ reaction is concerned, the process of solving is 
reflected also in register of measurable physiological reactions – changes in skin 
conductance.
1 In this paper intuition potential is perceived as an ability to utilize intuition when it leads to 
correct decisions. 
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2.1   Study 1 – Intuition leading to insight
Preliminary studies provided by the author of the paper were conducted on experienced 
police criminal intelligence analysts. Results indicated that, in the absence of clear 
facts, experts use intuition to find an anchoring point for data analysis. Subsequently, 
they take leap of faith to interpret their intuition and to define direction for further data 
collection and analysis. While explicit and probably unconscious data analysis, analysts 
gain insight with a solution to a given problem [19]. This strategy seems to be very 
helpful in situations when missing data preclude analysis decision-maker is fully aware 
of (see description of the process in Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. A mix of conscious and unconscious processes in situations of missing data employs 
expert intuition to find an anchoring point and a leap of faith to direct the search for solution to 
a problem. Data analysis allows to gain insight that provides a solution to a given problem.
Study 1 will be a continuation of the preliminary studies. The author of the paper 
proposes an experimental procedure to identify an ill structured situation where 
intuition leads to insight during negotiation process. More precisely, a hypothesis will 
be verified that intuition is a triggering factor for searching information leading to 
insight. 
In the study 1, according to the procedure provided in Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) [20],
negotiation games in form of human-computer interaction will be designed. The games 
will contain a dominating strategy that leads to consensus and they will take into 
account different negotiation styles (according to the Mastenborek’s classification [3]).
The study anticipates two phases. Phase 1 heads to detect intuition occurrence and 
phase 2 – manifestation of insight. The scenarios will base on case studies and the 
games will anticipate real payoffs. The experiment will allow to verify the subsequent 
partial hypotheses:
A. Intuition co-exists with a specific skin conductance,
B. Intuition could be ignored,
C. Inclusion of intuition leads to better negotiation strategies,
D. Inclusion of intuition improves negotiating process.
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2.2 Study 2 – Intuition potential measurement
Study 2 will be a continuation of previous research provided by the author of the paper. 
Results of the study allowed to detect individual differences in ability to implement 
intuition while solving problems among entrepreneurs [17]. A tool created for this 
research will be further developed and implemented in the context of group decision 
making. The aim of this study is to confirm a hypothesis about existence of individual 
differences in ability to implement intuition while problem solving as well as a 
feasibility of measuring those differences. 
2.3 Study 3 – Implementation of intuition into negotiation process
Study 3 uses results from Study 1 and Study 2 in order to verify hypothesis that there 
exist a procedure of negotiation support which increases effectiveness of negotiation 
due to an increase of potential of intuition. According to the hypothesis, increasing 
group intuition potential (by adding to the negotiation team people with a high intuition 
potential), will lead to better results. Subsequent partial hypotheses will be considered:
A. Introducing negotiation participants with high intuition potential will increase 
frequency of utilizing intuition,
B. Negotiation teams with higher group intuition potential will gain more 
insights,
C. Negotiation teams with higher group intuition potential will achieve better 
results (more consensus) than teams with lower potential. 
3   Scientific/practical merit
Based on results of the research project, a new dimension into negotiation process may 
be introduced – insight oriented intuition. Intuition could be implemented by providing
additional experts to the process of negotiation in situations when missing data preclude 
explicit analysis. Experts with task relevant experience and high intuition potential 
could support negotiation process. In situations when negotiation participants can’t 
progress a certain moment, experts’ intuition could be helpful. Experts would use their 
intuition to find a starting point for searching solution to a given problem. Afterwards, 
they will take a leap of faith to interpret their intuition and to indicate direction for data 
collection and analysis. While receiving and analyzing collected data, experts or 
negotiation participants would gain insight with a right solution to be implemented. 
Moreover, results of the study could be intoduced in the process of creating a profile of 
a negotiation team where team members could be selected with respect to a need for a 
more or less intuitive strategy. 
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Abstract. Previous research in consumer marketing has identified branding as a
powerful marketing tool. Only recently, research could acknowledge that
branding is also suitable for business-to-business (B2B) relationships and
capable for creating an emotional bonding with the brand. In B2B interactions,
which are highly dependent on the personal exchange, the human acts as a
personification of the brand. As products become interchangeable, in a growing
competitive environment, there is an increasing need to differentiate the brand.
One of the most relevant brand touch points in an B2B environment are
negotiations. In negotiations, one can have a direct experience with the brand.
Consequently, an accurate brand representation is required. While prior research
has proven, that branding is a crucial part of the overall company success, it is
rather surprising that no research exists, that analyzes the applicability of brand
management in negotiations. This dissertation is aiming to close this research
gap.
Keywords: negotiations, brand management, corporate branding, brand strategy,
business-to-business marketing, brand personification, brand representative
1 Motivation, research aims and research questions
From a historical perspective, branding developed out of the consumer marketing.
In business-to-consumer (B2C) marketing, branding is seen as a technique to enhance
the value of a product [12]. Because products are mainly bought in order to serve a
functional purpose, branding offers an opportunity to increase the emotional value [12].
Consequently, the functional and emotional brand attributes are one of the most
important indicators for B2C buying decisions [11], [13].
For the application of branding into the business context, the brand concept has to
be adjusted [19]. In B2B transactions, buying decision made by the company, are quite
different, not only in monetary terms but also in the collective manner of deciding [4].
This decision making process can be described as highly rational [13], [31].
Furthermore, the success of B2B interactions is highly dependent on personal exchange
[4]. Nevertheless, for a long period, the concept of B2B branding has not attracted a lot
of attention from the marketing science, due to the limited practical relevance [4].
Recent changes in the marketplace have led to a new perspective on branding in B2B
interactions [4]. Due to the growing global competition, the need for differentiation,
higher prices and the complexity of products and increasing commoditization,
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industrial companies are now becoming more and more aware of the use of branding
[4], [25], [26]. Furthermore, from an internal branding perspective, the use of the
employee in his role as a personification of the brand is highly important in markets,
where personal relationships are needed [17]. Therefore, personal communication
remains a significant opportunity for creating brand value [21]. Thus, in the B2B
environment the sales force is one of the most capable ways of delivering the brand
promises and holds a major role in communicating the emotional brand values [22],
[30]. So far, the benefits of humanizing the brand by the employee as a brand
representative in B2B setting are under researched [6], [14], [15].
The concept of the human as a brand representative originates out of the B2C
marketing and has been applied in the service context [3], [18], [30]. The idea of the
brand as a person can be realized in many different ways [3]. One method is to
humanize the brand through the employee and therefore make the brand come alive and
perceivable for the customer. Due to the lately changed perspective on B2B branding
in the practice, the marketing science has become attentive to brand management in
business relationships. Only recently, studies have been conducted which indicate the
relevance of the affective component of the brand in business relationships [22].
Additional studies could acknowledge that the perceived brand experience is highly
dependent on the personal employee interaction [5]. Moreover, it could be observed
that brand congruent employee behavior in personal face-to-face situations, has an
impact on customer satisfaction [7], [16], [28], [34], [35]. 
From the perspective of brand management, branding is necessary, when it is highly
effective and efficient to communicate the brand message. Therefore, brand managers
have to identify the relevant brand touch points. Brand touch points are situations in
the interaction between a company and a business customer, where the business
customer can directly perceive the brand [8]. Thus, in a B2B interaction, brand
consistent employee behavior is of crucial importance. A very common brand touch
point in B2B relationships are negotiations. In these conflicting situations, one can
examine the brand directly and very intensely through the negotiator in his role as a
personification of the brand. Consequently, the negotiator is acting as a brand
representative. Hence, negotiations are a highly relevant application area for brand
management. 
Although, negotiations are an essential part of everyday business life, they can occur
in many different forms. These different forms have to be distinguished from each
other. The reason for the appearance of the diversity of negotiations is the high
individuality and situational dependence of negotiations in a business context. Even
though, one can classify different forms of business negotiations (e.g. sales negotiations
or M&A negotiations), they are all characterized by a high degree of complexity. Some
characteristics for distinguishing negotiations are the frequency, the organizational
affiliation and the form of the settlement [32]. In general, a negotiation is defined as an
interaction between at least two parties with conflicting interest’s respectively partially
different preferences that concludes with a certain negotiation outcome [20].
Furthermore, the parties are aiming to find an agreement about one or more objectives,
whereby all parties are trying to influence the general solution to their benefit [32].
Therefore, one can understand a negotiation also as a joint decision making process
between at least two parties [32]. Constitutive features of a negotiation are for example
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the participation of more than one organization, the congruency of goals, the conflicting
preferences, the possibility of reaching a solution and the interactive process [32].
While prior research has proved that negotiations and the brand depict a significant
part of the overall company success and value, it is rather surprising, that no research
exists which provides comprehensive knowledge regarding the potential usage of
branding in negotiations. The aim of this dissertation is to close this research gap. Thus,
the objective of this dissertation is to examine a possible application of branding and
the implementation of the concept of humanizing the brand through the negotiator in a
negotiation context.
To fulfill this intention, different questions have to be considered. First, one could
argue, that when the brand is humanized through the negotiator as a representative of
the brand in a negotiation, a better negotiation outcome can be reached (research
question 1). This negotiation outcome refers to the individual negotiation outcome and
the satisfaction with the relationship. Another perspective on the objective of this
dissertation can be given by examining the benefits of humanizing the brand during
negotiations in general, not only for the specific negotiation but also for the brand as a
whole (research question 2). For example, one could have a positive experience with
the brand when personified through the negotiator during the negotiation, which could
lead to a positive brand perception, a better brand attitude and a better understanding
of the brand. All of these brand indicators could lastly lead to an increase in the brand
value. Finally, it is necessary, in order to give a holistic view on the topic, to take an
internal branding perspective and therefore to indicate the requirements for turning
employees into brand representatives (research question 3). Insights into the necessity
for an effective brand personification in negotiations are highly needed. For example,
the internal brand management has to ensure a sufficient brand knowledge and
therefore a high brand commitment of the negotiators in order to guarantee an optimal
brand representation.
2 Theoretical foundations
Due to the globalization of the markets and the increasing competition, it has become
necessary for companies to differentiate themselves [8]. Especially in B2B interactions,
it is important to generate a relationship with the business customer. In markets where
the actual product becomes a commodity, the emotional factors are gaining relevance.
Therefore, in order to retain a competitive advantage, an increasing number of B2B
companies have started to initialize brand management. This emotional bounding can
be reached through the creation of a relationships with the brand, which in the case of
business settings, is mostly the corporate brand [4], [8]. Brands are therefore a highly
relevant part of the company value [8]. In literature, this specific value created by the
brand is defined as brand equity [2]. Brand equity can be understood as a psychographic
or economic value [23]. The psychographic value of a brand, also defined as brand
strength, is related to the perception of the customer as well as the behavioral relevance
[9]. Whereas the economic value of a brand is related to a monetary meaning [9]. Due
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to the fact, that branding is an investment for a company, the benefits of this capital
spending have to be precise and clear [19], [1]. Recent research on B2B relationships
demonstrates a strong impact of branding on the product and service quality perceived
by the business customer [10]. This indicates that having a strong brand can lead to a
competitive advantage [1], [27].
A conceptual approach, that describes how a company can capture the value of the
brand, is given by the theory of the identity based brand management, which originates
mainly out of the approach of Aaker, who takes a value-based view on the brand
management [2], [8]. This value-based perspective respectively the approach of the
identity based brand management will be the theoretical foundation for the dissertation
[8], [29]. In the theory of the identity based brand management, a brand is “a bundle of
benefits with specific features” [8]. These features ensure that one bundle of benefits,
compared to another bundle of benefits that meets the same basic needs, is sustainably
differentiated from the viewpoint of the relevant target group [8]. The benefits of a
brand can be physical or symbolic [8]. The sum of all of these benefits sends external
signals that are perceived by the target group and lastly reflected in the brand image
[8]. The brand image is therefore the external image of the brand [8]. In literature, the 
brand image is defined by the psyche of the relevant external target group strongly 
anchored, condensed and judgmental perception of the brand [8].
To the contrary, the brand identity is related to the internal target group and consists
of the self-image of the brand [8]. The brand identity is essential for perceiving the
brand as authentic and different from competing brands [8]. The brand identity or brand
message is defined as a unique set of brand associations for defending and establishing
a brand [17]. The brand identity is necessary in giving a company and the employees
“direction, purpose and meaning for a brand” [2]. Furthermore, the brand image is the
spatial-temporally homogeneous features of a brand, which, from the perspective of the
internal target group, has a lasting influence on the character of the brand [8]. Therefore,
the brand identity is a result of a management process [9]. One element of the brand
identity is the brand personality, which is reflected in the way a brand is communicated
to the target group [8]. This brand communication is influenced by the origin of the
brand and the brand representatives, which in the case of a company, are mainly the
employees [3], [24]. 
An explanation of the origins of brand consistent employee behavior is given by the
approach of the behavioral branding [33]. According to this approach, the employee
has a significant influence on the brand perception of the external target group [33].
Furthermore, a brand inconsistent behavior of the employee in a selling situation can
lead to dissatisfaction of the customer [33]. The employees are therefore seen as the
internal target group [33]. Employee behavior, which is representative for the brand
and according to the brand image, is only possible, if the employee has sufficient brand
knowledge, a strong brand commitment and the ability to represent the brand in the
interaction with the customer [33]. In addition, the approach of the behavioral branding
can be distinguished between the interaction of the employee and the customer and the
interaction of the company and the employee [33]. The exchange between the employee
and the customer in a selling situation is defined as a touch point with the brand [8]. An
insight into the interaction between the brand image and the brand identity and an
application of the described approaches into the negotiation context is shown in figure
1.
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Fig. 1. In a negotiation, the identity of the brand is personified by the negotiator and perceived
by the counterpart. This perception of the brand is defined as brand image. Therefore, a
negotiation can be seen as a brand touch point [8].
3 Research approach, overview of the schedule and indication of the
current state
The dissertation will follow a deductive research approach. In the first stage, a
holistic literature review will be conducted. The relevant literature on negotiations and
branding, with a special consideration of the literature on brand personification, will be
identified, reviewed, analyzed and evaluated. Throughout this process, the current state
of marketing science on negotiations and branding respectively brand personification
as well as the most important theories, for examine the research questions, will be
determined. Based on constantly reviewing of the relevant literature, hypotheses will
be developed, in order to assess the applicability of brand management in negotiations
and to analyze the personification of a brand by a human as a brand representative in a
negotiation. These propositions will be tested empirically through qualitative
interviews, observations and questioners. These methods will allow answering the
research questions.
To give an insight into the preliminary results, a major part of the relevant literature
is already reviewed. Nevertheless, the literature review has turned out to be a permanent
process, due to number of on-going studies conducted in the research field of branding.
However, a first study is about to be initialized. This study is mainly concerned with
the brand personality, the personality of the negotiator and the negotiation behavior.
Furthermore, the study will include the internal branding perspective as well. For this
study, a questioner has been conceptualized. Besides this questioner, the study contains
also an observation of the negotiation behavior and the personality of the negotiators.
Moreover, the questioner has been pretested. The main part of the data generated will
take place during this summer.
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Abstract. In this work, a combinatorial auction-based mechanism is applied to a collaborative
transportation network, in which carriers interchange requests in order to increase eﬃciency. All
carriers operate in a hub-and-spoke network consisting of two clusters, where short-haul vehicles
cover intra-cluster routes and larger capacity long-haul vehicles are used for the inter-cluster
routes. Transport requests are reallocated between carriers via an auction organized by a cen-
tral, neutral institution. The mechanism is composed by four major processes: Request Selection,
Bundle Generation, Bid Generation and Winner Determination. Bidders select which requests to
send to the auctioneer. The auctioneer groups complementary requests into attractive bundles
to be oﬀered to all the carriers in the network. Carriers then bid on each of these bundles, and
ﬁnally, the auctioneer solves the Winner Determination problem by assigning bundles to carriers
minimizing the total cost to be paid. Calculating exact costs for each bundle would involve pro-
hibitive computational costs of solving a large number of vehicle routing problems (VRP’s). We
therefore propose a regression-based approximation for bundle evaluation. It is shown, that by
using the proposed methods for every process, it is possible to run combinatorial auctions of a
real-world size. Moreover, this mechanism allows the network to improve eﬃciency by reducing
total distance traveled by up to about 25% , in relatively small computing times.
Keywords: Combinatorial auctions, Bundle Generation, Bid Generation, Collaboration, Ap-
proximation.
1 Introduction
The competition found nowadays in the shipping and transportation industry keeps companies aiming
to operate more eﬃciently. To achieve this eﬃciency, two main considerations are brought up for re-
search and discussion. First, solution methods to optimize time and resources are continuously being
tested and improved, in [14] and [18], we are able to ﬁnd some of the latest developments for these
methods. Second, as mentioned in [8], [2] and [10], there is a growing interest in collaboration networks
motivated by the connectivity provided by the existing information technologies, in which suppliers,
customers and even competitors can be potential partners. For our research, we will focus in this sec-
ond point, speciﬁcally on the competitors collaboration.
Carriers have to transport a parcel or package from one customer’s location, known as the pick-up
node, to the destination customer’s location, known as the delivery node. A request is the transporta-
tion of a package between these two nodes. The parcel, its pick-up and delivery nodes, as well as other
characteristics from the customers, like time-windows for example, are all part of the information
needed to deﬁne a request. Carriers may perform their own set of requests with the resources they
have available, or they may look for collaboration opportunities with other carriers and shippers.
Companies might collaborate in diﬀerent ways, depending on their size and similarities. For example,
a big carrier might sometimes hire smaller shippers to perform part of their requests. Resources shar-
ing , such as depots, vehicles and human resources also presents an improvement opportunity based
on collaboration. Requests interchange is an attractive collaboration mechanism that allows carriers,
usually from similar sizes, to improve their sets of customers, reducing operational costs by saving time
and resources. Moreover, requests interchange might turn a disadvantageous scenario for one or more
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carriers, into a very attractive one for the collaboration network as a whole, in which the total proﬁt
might greatly increase.
To perform requests interchange, carriers start by selecting which requests they are willing to give
away, evaluating them one by one. Then, an interchange mechanism has to be used to allocate these
selected requests to the carrier that value them the most. In order to do so, we resort to the use of
auctions. The whole mechanism aims to minimize system wide costs, this means it should provide a
successful reallocation of requests, which, in a worst case scenario, corresponds to the initial allocation,
getting zero improvement but guaranteeing that the system is not worse oﬀ.
By participating in this collaboration approach, a carrier is willing to share some information about
their customers and requests. This amount of information diﬀers when dealing with two types of
auctions:
– Centralized auctions: This setting presents a central neutral institution as an auctioneer, to which
each carrier transfers requests that they want to be performed by other carriers. The auctioneer
generates bundles and solves an allocation problem based on the bids submitted by the carriers.
– Individual auctions: This approach is very similar to the Centralized Auction. The main diﬀerence
is that in this case, each carrier is allowed to run its own auction. The bundles contain requests
exclusively from the carrier running the auction. The winner determination is then solved as an
allocation problem based on the bids submitted by the carriers.
The core of this research lays on proposing solution methods for sub-processes for these auctions-
based mechanisms. From the obtained results, we will be able to consider maximum costs for a central
institution needed for centralized auctions, the main diﬀerences between individual and centralized
auctions in terms of obtained improvements. Finally, results will be compared with those obtained
from a centralized planning approach, which assumes a central authority with perfect information
from all carriers.
In section 2, the collaboration mechanism is described with its sub-processes. Section 3 presents a
proposed solution method to estimate routing costs and develop solution methods for the mechanism’s
sub-processes. Section 4 provides a description and results of an initial application of the mechanism.
Section 5 presents conclusions and in section 6 a research overview for the dissertation project is
proposed.
2 Combinatorial Auctions-based Collaboration Mechanism
In this work, we include a complete mechanism, starting with the selection of requests that carriers
are willing to give away and ﬁnishing with the assignment of the ﬁnal sets of requests back to carriers.
In ﬁgure 1, the four main processes of the mechanism are shown. Arrows show the logic order they
should follow, this means, a process has to be completed for the next one to start.
2.1 Request Selection
A carrier should determine which requests to give away, based on the set of requests they have initially.
In Berger and Bierwirth [2], the marginal proﬁt of a request is taken as the only indicator of its attrac-
tiveness, i.e. how good or bad a request is to the carrier. A way to get this indicator, is solving routing
problems for the set of requests taking one out at a time. So, if we have a set N , with n requests, we
should solve n routing problems. One important aspect about the marginal value of a request is that
it is not an additive property. The marginal value of two requests is not the sum of their marginal
values. This can be easily observed in any routing problem.
Gansterer and Hartl, in [10], propose 18 diﬀerent selection methods, including a random choice. These
methods are geographical-based, proﬁt-based or combined. Based on their results, the authors conclude
that geographical-based methods dominate pure marginal proﬁt-based methods. An extra remark we
can state about the geographical-based methods is that they take smaller computing times.
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Fig. 1: Mechanism Main Processes
Gray colored frames indicate the central institution is the decision maker for these processes. As for
white colored frames, each carrier is the decision maker.
2.2 Bundle Generation
Once every carrier has sent requests to the central institution, they have to be grouped into bundles
to conduct combinatorial auctions. Previous work like in Berger and Bierwirth’s [2] and Gansterer
and Hartl’s [10] has considered all possible combinations of requests, which means getting 2m − 1
bundles, where m is the number of requests to be traded. This approach, of course, contains the best
combination of bundles to be assigned, however, a large number of requests, generating a very large
number of bundles, could make the winner determination solution very diﬃcult to obtain, therefore,
new methods on how to generate an attractive and limited set of bundles would be recommended to
deal with large problems.
2.3 Bid Generation
Every carrier participating in the collaboration network acts as a bidder in the auction mechanism.
The bid they make for a bundle, should be its marginal cost when it is added to the remaining set of
requests each carrier has. Here, we call remaining set, to the set of requests a carrier has kept from
their original assignment, after sending some requests to the central institution to be exchanged.
The way to get this marginal cost in works like Berger and Bierwirth’s [2] and Gansterer and Hartl’s
[10], is getting the diﬀerence between the solution of the remaining set routing problem and the solution
of the set containing the remaining set and the bundle routing problem.
2.4 Winner Determination
The central institution, based on the received bids, solves the Winner Determination Problem (WDP),
which provides a ﬁnal assignment solution. This solution must assign all submitted requests back to
carriers, if no improvement is found, requests should be sent back to their original carriers and no
interchange should be conducted.If both, bundle and bid generation solutions are performed in such a
way that only a relatively small set of attractive bundles is generated with truthful bids, the (WDP)
could be solved as an exact assignment problem.
3 Regression Based Approximation
A critical aspect in the collaboration mechanism mentioned in section 2, is determining the cost that a
request or group of requests represents for a carrier. In practice, this cost can be determined by solving
logistics problems such as the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) or the Vehicle Routing Problem
(VRP). For both, algorithms have been developed over the last years, being able to get a solution in
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a few seconds [18]. However, when dealing with a large number n of requests and their combinations
(2n − 1)[2], we could end up facing thousands of diﬀerent bundles of requests, which means thousands
of logistics problems to be solved, taking thousands of seconds.
A proposed method being developed in this research is using Regression-based Approximation to esti-
mate the costs that a bundle will have when it is assigned to a carrier. Approximate costs are obtained
by estimating them from geographical and non-geographical properties that are easy to obtain from a
bundle. The main beneﬁt from this method is an enormous decrease in computing times, allowing us
to generate thousands of bids in a few seconds, which of course, allows the collaboration network to
deal with a larger amount of collaboration.
These methods use the TSP or VRP total distances as dependent variable, and geographical and non-
geographical properties as independent variables. For instance, working with a TSP, we are able to
estimate the total distance of a single tour, using parameters obtained from a multi-variate regres-
sion, using distances as independent variables. Speciﬁcally, minimum and maximum distances between
nodes, variances for every coordinate, the total sum of distances to the middle point and their variance
were used as independent variables. In the regression, an R2 = 99, 6677% is obtained from 480 obser-
vations. In ﬁgure 2a, we can observe the errors when the predicted and observed values are compared.
As for the VRP’S, the same process is performed, this time estimating the total distance for several
tours on two regions joint by a long-haul connection, using distances to the depots, a binary indi-
cating the type of time windows (tight or broad), a binary indicating if the long-haul is ﬂexible or
ﬁxed, quantities and interactions between variables as independent variables. This regression yields an
R2 = 99, 9602% with 443 observations. In ﬁgure 2b, the errors for the comparison between observed
and predicted values are shown, having diﬀerences close to 0% on average.
The regressions are ﬁrst ran with generated data similar to the actual data we are working with. The
obtained parameters can then be used to estimate the costs for every bundle as if they were part of
the set of requests each carrier has.
The regression-based approximation methods are mainly useful for bids generation. Nevertheless, their
results should be taken into account for requests selection and bundle generation, suggesting which
properties inﬂuence total costs the most.
(a) Distribution of approximation errors for TSP
Application
(b) Distribution of approximation errors for VRP
Application
Fig. 2: Distributions of approximation errors.
4 Double Traveling Salesman Problem Application
The complete mechanism has been tested with regression based solution methods in a double TSP
scenario. The solution methods for every process shown in ﬁgure 1 are described in the following lines.
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Request Selection: Nine diﬀerent selection strategies were proposed and tested; these are:
– OwnDepot1: Requests far from the carrier’s depot in cluster 1 were selected.
– OwnDepot2: Requests far from the carrier’s depot in cluster 2 were selected.
– OwnDepotC: Requests far from the carrier’s depot in both clusters combined were selected. The
sum of the distances on both clusters is considered.
– OtherDepots1: Requests close from other carriers’ depots in cluster 1 were selected.
– OtherDepots2: Requests close from other carriers’ depots in cluster 2 were selected.
– OtherDepotsC: Requests close from other carriers’ depots in both clusters combined were selected.
The sum of the distances on both clusters is considered.
– SelectiveOwn: The carrier selects which cluster is worse for her, depending on that then uses
OwnDepot1 or OwnDepot2.
– SelectiveOther: The carrier selects which cluster is worse for her, depending on that then uses
OtherDepots1 or OtherDepots2.
– Random Choice: A random number of randomly selected requests are selected.
Bundle Generation: In order to have a manageable number of bundles, requests are grouped with
the closest requests to them. A minimum and maximum sizes are set based on the number of requests
each carrier sent to the central institution. Taking one request as a seed point at a time, requests are
grouped with the closest requests (on each cluster and combined). Every original set of requests sent
by every carrier is also a bundle, this guarantees a feasible solution that is not worse than the original
allocation.
Bid Generation: Every carrier bids on all bundles. The bids are generated using the regression based
approach described in section 3. The bid corresponds to the diﬀerence between the estimated costs of
performing the whole set of requests including the bundle and the estimated costs of performing the
set of requests excluding the bundle.
Winner Determination: To get the ﬁnal allocation, a mixed integer program is used.
C set of carriers
R set of requests
B set of bundles
pbc bid for bundle b oﬀered by carrier c
qrb binary parameter indicating if request r is in bundle b
xbc binary variable indicating if bundle b is assigned to carrier c
min
∑
c
∑
b
pbcxbc s.t. (1)
∑
b
xbc ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ C (2)
∑
c
xbc ≤ 1 ∀b ∈ B (3)
∑
c
∑
b
xbcqrb = 1 ∀r ∈ R (4)
Equation 1 is the objective function, which minimizes the total allocation cost. Constraint 2 ensures that
a bundle is allocated to one carrier. Constraint 3 ensures that a carrier obtains at most 1 bundle. Constraint
4 ensures that each request is allocated to one carrier.
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4.1 Experimental Data
Experimental instances were generated. Every instance corresponds to a network in which a set of carriers
exchange requests in two regions which are connected by a long-haul vehicle. A carrier has one depot on each
region and customers are paired, i.e. one customer in region 1 represents a pick-up/delivery node while a
customer in region 2 represents its corresponding delivery/pick-up node. Two groups of instances were created
in a 200x200 distance units space.
– Random Positioned Depots: Depots were randomly generated in both regions. Instances correspond to a
4 carrier network, each serving 25 customers with similar demands. The long-haul trip is assumed to have
enough capacity for all the requests together, so they all could be transported in one single trip. Results
for these instances are shown in table 1 in the appendix.
– Sector Positioned Depots: Both regions were divided ﬁrst into sectors. A depot then, is randomly positioned
within a sector in every region. These instances also correspond to a 4 carrier network, with 25 randomly
positioned customers with similar demands. In this case, the long-haul is also assumed to have enough
capacity for all requests to be transported in one single trip. Results for these instances are shown in table
2 in the appendix.
5 Conclusions
– Geographical based evaluation strategies, bidding generation, bundle generation and winner determination
shown in this research represent a relatively low computational eﬀort, solving the whole process in accept-
able times, up to three magnitudes lower than when solved with other methods (e.g. routing algorithms
for bidding generation, all possible combinations for bundle generation, etc).
– Approximation methods can be successfully used to estimate total distances(& costs) in the shown scenar-
ios. Computational calculations for this process are simple and practically immediate.
– Evaluation strategies, as well as bidding and bundle generation methods, should be generated based on
the approximation methods used to estimate distances in this two-cluster scenario.
6 Research Overview
As part of the FEAT1 (Fair & Eﬃcient Allocation of Transportation) Project ), which goal is to improve the
system-wide eﬃciency in a transportation network, our research deals with the development of a collaboration
model based on combinatorial auctions.
In the ﬁrst part of the dissertation project, we are looking for eﬃcient solution methods for the Request Se-
lection, Bundle Generation, Bid Generation and Winner Determination sub-processes. The ﬁndings obtained
from this, allow us to determine the degree of collaboration we are able to support, in terms of the amount of
requests that can be interchanged in acceptable computing times.
For the second part, we are planning to apply these solution methods in auctions-based collaboration mech-
anisms. Moreover, we are interested in ﬁnding how much improvement can be done by having carriers that
collaborate with each other under this request interchange approach. One aspect that calls for our interest, is
the comparison between centralized and individual auctions, mainly because this can set a limit for a central
institution costs.
In the third part, the auctions-based collaboration mechanisms will be compared with a centralized planning
approach 2, which assumes that all requests information is known by a central authority that performs the best
expected request allocation to a set of carriers with the objective of minimizing costs. Here, we would observe
how eﬃcient the collaboration mechanisms are when compared to a benchmark that must be better in terms
of this objective. Our main interest would be to determine how much collaboration should be performed in
order to get a desired level of improvement, keeping in mind that it depends on how good the initial allocation
is; the worse it is at a beginning, the larger the improvement that can be made.
1 Project funded by the Austrian Science Fund (Project number P 27858.
2 Research from a joint project
56 Doctoral Consortium, Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017
14 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
Bibliography
[1] Na An, Wedad Elmaghraby, and Pinar Keskinocak. Bidding strategies and their impact on revenues in
combinatorial auctions. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, 3(4):337–357, 2005.
[2] Susanne Berger and Christian Bierwirth. Solutions to the request reassignment problem in collaborative
carrier networks. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 46(5):627–638,
2010.
[3] Tobias Buer. An exact and two heuristic strategies for truthful bidding in combinatorial transport auctions.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.1928, 2014.
[4] Ralph Cassady. Auctions and auctioneering. Univ of California Press, 1967.
[5] Jin Ho Choi and Ingoo Han. Combinatorial auction based collaborative procurement. Journal of Computer
Information Systems, 47(3):118–127, 2007.
[6] Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg. Combinatorial auctions. 2006.
[7] Sven De Vries and Rakesh V Vohra. Combinatorial auctions: A survey. INFORMS Journal on computing,
15(3):284–309, 2003.
[8] O¨zlem Ergun, Gu¨ltekin Kuyzu, and Martin Savelsbergh. Shipper collaboration. Computers & Operations
Research, 34(6):1551–1560, 2007.
[9] Margaretha Gansterer and Richard F Hartl. Bundle generation in combinatorial transportation auctions.
(Working Paper), 2016.
[10] Margaretha Gansterer and Richard F Hartl. Request evaluation strategies for carriers in auction-based
collaborations. OR Spectrum, 38(1):3–23, 2016.
[11] Mario Guajardo and Mikael Ro¨nnqvist. A review on cost allocation methods in collaborative transporta-
tion. International Transactions in Operational Research, 23(3):371–392, 2016.
[12] Paul Klemperer. Auctions: theory and practice. Available at SSRN 491563, 2004.
[13] Vijay Krishna. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009.
[14] Gilbert Laporte. The traveling salesman problem: An overview of exact and approximate algorithms.
European Journal of Operational Research, 59(2):231–247, 1992.
[15] R Preston McAfee and John McMillan. Auctions and bidding. Journal of economic literature, 25(2):699–
738, 1987.
[16] Paul Robert Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[17] Selvaprabu Nadarajah and James H Bookbinder. Less-than-truckload carrier collaboration problem: mod-
eling framework and solution approach. Journal of Heuristics, 19(6):917–942, 2013.
[18] Sophie N Parragh, Karl F Doerner, and Richard F Hartl. A survey on pickup and delivery problems.
Journal fu¨r Betriebswirtschaft, 58(1):21–51, 2008.
[19] Aleksandar Pekecˇ and Michael H Rothkopf. Combinatorial auction design. Management Science,
49(11):1485–1503, 2003.
[20] Michael H Rothkopf and Sunju Park. An elementary introduction to auctions. Interfaces, 31(6):83–97,
2001.
[21] Jiongjiong Song and Amelia C Regan. An auction based collaborative carrier network. University of
California Transportation Center, 2003.
[22] Ralf Sprenger and Lars Mo¨nch. A methodology to solve large-scale cooperative transportation planning
problems. European Journal of Operational Research, 223(3):626–636, 2012.
[23] Cheﬁ Triki, Simona Oprea, Patriza Beraldi, and Teodor Gabriel Crainic. The stochastic bid generation
problem in combinatorial transportation auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 236(3):991–
999, 2014.
[24] Christine Vanovermeire, Kenneth So¨rensen, Alex Van Breedam, Bart Vannieuwenhuyse, and Sven Ver-
strepen. Horizontal logistics collaboration: decreasing costs through ﬂexibility and an adequate cost
allocation strategy. International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications, 17(4):339–355, 2014.
[25] William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of ﬁnance,
16(1):8–37, 1961.
[26] Xin Wang and Herbert Kopfer. Collaborative transportation planning of less-than-truckload freight. OR
spectrum, 36(2):357–380, 2014.
[27] Qing Chuan Ye, Yingqian Zhang, and Rommert Dekker. Fair task allocation in transportation. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1505.07434, 2015.
Doctoral Consortium, Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 
14 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
57
Appendix
Results
In both tables, column 1 lists the strategies used for requests selection. Column 2 shows the average im-
provement made by the mechanism, while column 3 shows the maximum improvement obtained in a single
instance. Column 4 and 5 show the number of requests sent to auctions and interchanged. Column 6 shows
the percentage of requests that have been interchanged. Columns 7 and 8 contain an improvement ratio, i.e.
the average improvement made by a single requests being sent and interchanged respectively. Column 9 shows
the computing time needed by the mechanism, starting with the requests selection and ending with the new
allocation.
Strategy % Imp Max Imp Requests Int % Ratios Time
Sent Inter Sent Inter [s]
OwnDepot1 10.40 26.58 38.03 32.45 85% 0.29 0.34 31.92
OwnDepot2 10.39 27.50 36.31 31.39 86% 0.31 0.36 42.35
OwnDepotC 6.61 19.45 33.44 25.76 65% 0.19 0.24 36.89
OtherDepots1 3.58 17.12 45.76 28.16 65% 0.08 0.11 38.15
OtherDepots2 3.63 15.04 47.07 27.14 61% 0.08 0.12 34.81
OtherDepotsC 1.39 8.55 26.60 14.95 49% 0.04 0.05 26.89
SelectiveOwn 8.66 22.69 37.66 30.21 81% 0.27 0.33 27.93
SelectiveOther 3.18 13.26 44.76 24.75 60% 0.08 0.11 32.14
Random 3.57 13.23 36.90 24.93 68% 0.10 0.14 40.96
Table 1: Results Sector Positioned Depots
Strategy % Imp Max Imp Requests Int % Ratios Time
Sent Inter Sent Inter [s]
OwnDepot1 5.88 15.53 35.88 22.15 61% 0.17 0.25 53.44
OwnDepot2 6.21 18.02 38.32 21.87 55% 0.17 0.28 46.59
OwnDepotC 5.35 20.80 35.79 22.57 58% 0.15 0.24 59.36
OtherDepots1 3.38 17.20 40.15 24.08 61% 0.09 0.13 50.33
OtherDepots2 3.28 13.63 38.65 22.68 64% 0.10 0.13 59.79
OtherDepotsC 1.39 9.27 15.94 10.23 51% 0.07 0.10 44.83
SelectiveOwn 6.79 18.45 48.92 29.68 60% 0.14 0.21 59.89
SelectiveOthers 3.27 10.51 35.60 19.87 62% 0.11 0.16 43.87
Random 3.47 9.97 35.84 24.69 67% 0.10 0.15 64.64
Table 2: Results Random Positioned Depots
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Abstract: The reasonable position of solar power station has a direct effect on the 
utilization of resources and the interests of the access. And in a case that if the decision 
makers give a pair-wise comparison matrix (PCM) which is not consistent in teams of the 
location choice algorithm of solar power station in the Interval Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(IAHP), the derived priority vector should be as similar to each column vector of the PCM 
as possible. Therefore, a cosine maximization method (CM) for interval positive 
complementary matrix is proposed in this paper, which combines the transformation 
formulate, cosine similarity measure and the interval numbers possibility degree matrix. It is 
not necessary to consider the acceptably consistent of the PCM. And then a new interval 
cosine consistency index is defined. Finally, using the method to deal with a siting case of 
solar power station.
Keywords: Interval Analytic Hierarchy Process, Priority weights, Cosine similarity measure,
Solar Power Station.
1. Introduction
China is the largest country in the production of electricity with 24.1% of the global share. The 
unpredicted growth in the China economy leads to increase in the usage of electricity. In China,
according to 2015 statistics, 76.6% of the electricity is produced from non-renewable sources: 4% -
nuclear,  73.5%-power-fossil and the grid solar generated 421.8 million kilowatts, an increase of 69.66 
percent over the previous year. It is forecasted that in China, non-fossil energy of primary energy 
consumption ratio reached 15% by 2020, reached 20% by 2030. China has a large population, resulting 
in a low per-capita average of energy resources in the world. This problem is particularly acute for 
solar power. Compared with conventional source of energy, solar energy has some unique advantages.
They include: inexhaustible, inexhaustible, clean, safe and reliable, low operation cost. From the 
function and necessity views, solar power can solve the problem of supplying electricity in some areas.
The national energy administration issued a "Solar energy development 13th five-year plan". By the 
end of 2020, solar power generation capacity reach 110 million kw or more, among them, the 
photovoltaic power generation capacity of 105 million KW or more, on the basis of "twelfth five-year" 
every year to keep stable development scale; Solar thermal power generation installed 5 million 
kw.Solar thermal utilization heating area of 800 million square meters. By 2020, the solar year reached 
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more than 140 million tons of standard coal. In the research of these areas, it is an important and 
interesting issue to select the location of solar power station in China. Considering the resources in the 
economy and social benefits, the location of solar power should concern the total investment cost, 
generating revenue, climate and meteorological conditions, the operation and maintenance cost. In
addition, the utilization of power also needs to refer to the transportation, geology, conditions such as 
network transmission and construction factors [26]. So solar power station site selection is a 
comprehensive evaluation problem involving multi-factor. Due to the influence degree of each factor is 
determined by people's subjective judgment, inevitably, the evaluation conclusion is fuzziness.
Therefore, in order to improve the accuracy of location and reliability, a method handling multiple 
factors and fuzzy evaluation[19] and the subjective judgment problem have to be obtained.
When experts put forward the influence information with a pair-wise comparison matrix (PCM) of 
point value, the Analytic Hierarchy Process(AHP)[17,1]is useful to help decision maker(DM) to 
choose the reasonable position of solar power station. But in practical application, a point value is not 
easy to get, and in classical AHP, a point value is obviously unreasonable to indicate the importance of 
the difference between two more factors, for lacking of effective information of intrinsic link, or 
because of different experts do not have the same understanding of the importance with subjective 
differences. Interval Analytic Hierarchy Process(IAHP)[17]changes the description of factors from 
point value to interval number, this shift makes the understanding of things more objective, and 
decrease the subjective judgment in order to make it more accuracy. IAHP is one of the important 
methods for multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) problems [13]. MCDM mainly focuses on the 
ranking, sorting and choice types of decision making problems [2, 12, 14]. This paper only discusses
the ranking problem, which consists in rank ordering of all alternatives with respect to the considered 
criteria [6,9,18]. In IAHP, the decision maker (DM) determine a PCM by analyzing collected 
information, and then derive a reliable priority weight from PCM.
It is a key issue to design the prioritization methods [5] and the calculation methods for the 
derivation. Kou et al. [7,8] maximized the sum of the cosine of the angel between the priority weight 
and each column vector of a PCM and proposed the cosine maximization method (CM) [3]. In the prior 
AHP theory, DM used the real number to estimate the MCDM problems. However, sometimes it is 
very difficult to gain a precise numerical value for DM’s judgment as the uncertainty and complexity 
of the decision-making problems in reality. Naturally, it is better to choose the fuzzy or interval ratios 
to illustrate the MCDM problems. Based on this, Van Laarhoven et al. [20] extended the Saaty’s 
priority in which they considered their opinion as fuzzy numbers. Liu [13] defined the consistency of a 
interval positive reciprocal matrix. In [21], Wang et al. gave another definition of it. Besides, the 
transformation formulate between interval positive reciprocal and complementary matrix were given 
by Liu [10,11]. And many researchers have paid more attention on the methods of deriving the priority 
weights from a interval positive complementary matrix [4, 6, 22,23].
In this paper, a new method of generating priority weights from an interval positive complementary 
matrix is proposed, which is based on cosine similarity measure. The similarity measure between the 
priority vector and each column vector of the PCM is denoted by the cosine similarity measure 
between them due to its simplicity. This paper will combine the transformation formulate, cosine 
similarity measure and the interval numbers possibility degree matrix to deal with the priority weights 
derivation from interval positive complementary matrix. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
In section 2, the related concepts of interval positive complementary matrix and cosine maximization 
method are given, a new interval cosine consistency index is defined. Section 3 gives a example which 
about siting a place of four options for building a solar power station to test our method. In section 4, 
the main conclusions are shown.
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2. Preliminaries and methodology
In this part, we give some related concepts of interval positive complementary matrix and cosine 
maximization method, and then develop a new consistency index related with the CM to measure the 
inconsistency level of an interval positive complementary matrix. At last, we discuss the interval cosine 
consistency index.
2.1. Interval positive complementary matrix
Considering a set of alternatives },,{ ,21 nxxxU L in a MCDM problem, we can get a interval positive 
complementary matrix A through pairwise comparison of each criterion, several definitions and 
theorems are introduced as follows:
Definition 2.1 ([16]). A matrix nnijaA u )( is said to be positive reciprocal, if for all },,2,1{, nji L ,
which exists that 0!ija , 1 iia , 1 jiijaa with 991 dd ija .
Definition 2.2 ([16]). A positive reciprocal matrix nnijaA u )( is said to be consistent if kjikij aaa  for 
all },,2,1{, nji L .
Definition 2.3 ([16]). PRM nnijaA u )( is said to be acceptably consistent, if the consistency ratio(C.R.) 
is 0.1 or less, where .1..,...... max   nnICIRICRC O
n is the dimension of  matrix A, and maxO is the principal eigenvalue of matrix A. ..IR is the average 
..IC of a large number of randomly generated positive reciprocal matrix and depends on the orders of 
the matrices.
Definition 2.4 ([19]). nnijbB u )( is called a positive complementary matrix if ;0!ijb ;5.0 iib
1  jiij bb with 10 dd ijb , for all },,2,1{, nji L .
Where the element ijb represents a fuzzy preference degree of alternative ix over jx .
Definition 2.5 ([19]). A positive complementary matrix nnijbB u )( is said to be consistent if 
5.0 kjikij bbb for all },,2,1{, nji L .
Now, let us consider that a decision maker compares each pair of alternatives on 
},,,{ 21 nxxxX L and expresses the opinions as an interval positive reciprocal/complementary matrix. 
The expression interval positive reciprocal matrix was firstly given by Saaty [15] as:
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where iju indicates that ix is between iju and iju times as important as jx . iju and iju are real 
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There are the following definitions:
Definition 2.5 ([10]). Let U be an interval positive reciprocal matrix. If the positive reciprocal 
matrix C and D determined by using formula (1) are all of consistency, the U is said to be consistent.
Definition 2.6 ([10]). If the positive reciprocal matrix C and D, which are determined by using 
formula (1) from an interval positive reciprocal matrix U, are acceptably consist, then U is called an 
acceptably consist interval positive reciprocal matrix.
Moreover, when the DMs estimate the judgments on },,,{ 21 nxxxX L in terms of an interval positive 
complementary matrix it follows[23]:
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where ijv indicates that ix is between ijv and ijv times as important as jx . ijv and ijv are real numbers, 
 dd jiij vv0 , 1   jiij vv and 1   jiij vv .
Theorem 2.1 ([10]). Let V = (vi j)n×n be an interval positive complementary matrix. If each element of 
nnijuU u )( satisfies: 129  ijviju , then U is an interval positive reciprocal matrix.
Theorem 2.2 ([10]). Let V be a consistent interval positive complementary matrix. The interval positive 
reciprocal matrix U derived from V through Theorem 2.1 is consistent.
Definition 2.7 ([10]). Let V be an interval positive complementary matrix. If the interval positive 
reciprocal matrix U derived from V through Theorem 2.1 is acceptable consistent, then V is called an 
acceptable consistent interval positive complementary matrix.
2.2. Cosine maximization method (CM)
In order to develop the CM of interval positive complementary matrix for the priority vector derivation, 
we need to know the process of CM.
Theorem 2.3 ([11]). Let two vectors be Tiniii tttt ),,,( 21 L and Tjnjjj tttt ),,,( 21 L , then the cosine 
similarity measure between two vectors ti and tj is denoted as
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Let V be an interval positive complementary matrix, the interval positive reciprocal matrix U could 
be derived from V through Theorem 2.1. Then the positive reciprocal matrices C and D could be 
derived by using formula (1) from the matrix U. We assume that the priority weights from C and D
based on the cosine similarity measure of Theorem 2.3 have been derived. Let
),,,( 21 nxxxw L with 11  ¦  ni iw and ),,2,1(,0 niwi L t be a priority vector derived from C using some 
prioritization method. In AHP, we know that, if C is consistent [15], ),,2,1,( nji
w
wc
j
i
ij L  . From 
above formula, C can be precisely characterized by
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And then, C can be viewed as consisting of the following n column vectors:
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Let jS be the cosine similarity measure between the priority vector w and the jth column vector jc of 
C. Where Tnwwww ),,,( 21 L and Tnjjjj cccc ),,,( 21 L . By Theorem 2., it follows that:
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In order to derive a reliable priority vector, the ),( jcwCSM of a PCM should be equal to 1 as highly 
as possible. Inspired by this idea, Kou [7] constructed an optimization model as follows:
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The optimization model (4) can be equivalently transformed into the following form:
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With regard to the above model (5), There are the following theorems.
Theorem 2.4. Let Tnwwww )~,,~,~(~ **2*1* L be the optimal solution to optimization model (5) and CѽEH
the optimal objective function value of it. Then 
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Proof of Theorem 2.4. Refer to [6].
Furthermore, we write }.,,2,1,0,1),,,({
121 ¦   !   : nj iiTn niwwwwww LL Then the objective 
function C of optimization model (4) has a unique maximize point : Tnwwww )~,,~,~(~ **2*1* L .
That is to say, optimization model (4) can produce a unique solution, avoiding the inconvenience of 
how to choose one solution from a set of solution. The unique solution can be indirectly determined by 
optimization model (5). We have .,,2,1,~
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2** niwww
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where E is called weight assignment coefficient. Solving the following system of equation
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Theorem 2.5. Let PCM nnijcC u )( be perfectly consistent, the CM method can precisely derive the 
optimal objective function value nS  * and the priorities ).,,2,1(1
1
* njcw
n
i ijj
L  ¦  
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Refer to [6].
In the process above, the priority vector of positive reciprocal matrices C have been derived. 
Similarly, the priority vector of positive reciprocal matrices D could been derived. It is obvious that the 
combined weight of C and D is the interval weights of  positive reciprocal matrices V with Cosine 
maximization method. But the interval weights is uncertain, and they can not present the clear result 
for DMs.
2.3. The possibility degree
In order to get the final ranking, we should draw support from the possibility degree.
Definition 2.8 [10]. Let ],[ 111 rlW  and ],[ 222 rlW  be two interval weights, 11 rl z and 22 rl z ,then the 
possibility degree of 21 WW t is defined as:
ssWWp '21 )(  t ,
with ))(( 2211 lrlrs  .And the possibility degree of 12 WW t is defined as:
ssWWp ''12 )(  t .
Where 's and ''s are defined as those given in[10].
A simple row-column elimination method is utilized to generate the ranking vector from the 
possibility degree matrix. That is, one first finds a row in the matrix where all elements except for the 
diagonal ones are larger than 0.5. If this row corresponds to ix , then ix is the most (likely) preferred 
alternative. Then eliminating the thi row and thi column in the matrix, one finds the second preferred 
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alternative among the remaining alternatives such as jx One has ji xx f for 5.0!ijp or ji xx ~ for 
5.0  jiij pp hereafter the notionĀ f āindicates that one alternative is preferred to another. Repeating 
the above processes, we can rank all the alternatives.
2.4 Priority weights derivation
Many method of deriving priority weights from interval positive reciprocal matrix have been 
proposed, including various mathematical programming models. Moreover, it is reasonable and natural 
to express the DM’s judgments as interval positive complementary matrix, and there is a 
transformation formula between interval positive complementary matrix and interval positive 
reciprocal matrix, also with the aid of the possibility degree, we can rely on combing pre-existing 
methods to deal with the priority weights derivation issue of interval positive complementary matrix.
In order to facilitate the solution process of the new method, the involved steps are briefly described 
as follows: 
Step 1. Consider a decision making problem with an interval positive complementary matrix 
nnijvV u )( .
Step 2. Transform the interval positive complementary matrix nnijvV u )( to an interval positive 
reciprocal matrix U by Theorem 2.1.
Step 3. Normalize the interval positive reciprocal matrix U to the transformation matrix 
nncc ijbB u )( and nndd ijbB u )( through formula (a).
Step 4. Calculate the transformed weights *~ ijcw ,
*~
ijdw , ni ,,2,1 L through formula (b). 
Step 5. Calculate the optimal objective function value *cC , *dC through formula (c). 
Step 6. Calculate the weight assignment coefficient *cE , *dE through formula (d).
Step 7. Calculate the final priority vector Tcnccc wwww ),,,( **2*1* L and Tdnddd wwww ),,,( ** 2*1* L through 
formula (e).
Sept 8. Utilizing }],max{},,[min{ **** dicidicii wwwww  , for ni ,,2,1 L , one obtains the interval weight 
vector. 
Step 9. Construct the possibility degree matrix and rank all the alternatives by utilizing the simple 
row-column elimination method through Definition 2.8.
2.4. Interval cosine consistency index (ICCI)
It is well known that several consistency index and methods have been proposed. Analyzing above 
process, *C is the optimal objective function value of model (4). If a PCM is consistent, we have 
nC  * , otherwise, nC  *0 : So Kou et al. defined the cosine consistency index of PCM, which is 
write nCCCI   * , it is values in the interval ]1,0( . If the PCM is consistent, it follows that CCI = 1, 
otherwise, 0 < CCI < 1:
When we consider a interval positive complementary matrix, we can obtain two *C , one is for 
positive complementary matrix C, the other one is for positive complementary matrix D. In order to 
make eliminate the influence of the size of a PCM, we should divide the objective function value *cC
and  *dC by 2, resulting in nCCICCI dc 2/)( **  . As a general rule, one would expert ICCI to be at least 
90%.
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3. Case Study
Case. Thirty percent of territory of China is desert and Gobi, where there is plenty of solar radiation.
The potential power of solar energy of China is 50 times that of the Grand Three Gouges Hydraulic 
Power Station, or two times the total amount of electricity used in the year 2006, which would meet the 
expected total demand for electricity of the whole country in 2020ˊWhere are the profitable candidate 
sites for the plants and the technique-economic properties of the sites is the serious problem. So we 
give an experiment to select the optimal place from Anhui, Jilin, Sichuan, Shanghai (Figure 1)to locate 
more necessary solar power station.
Hebei
Shanghai
Jilin
Sichuan
Figure 1. Distribution of solar energy in China(MJ/m2)
A committee comprised of three experts )3,2,1(  kek has been set up to select a place from four 
candidate places )4,3,2,1,(  iYi to build solar power station, experts consider the distribution of land 
cover and the state of art techniques of power plant, then they give an initial estimate of the cost of the 
solar heat electricity generation, and make an estimation of the cost and benefit with these factors: total 
solar radiation, landuse and technology, maintenance expense and environmental and ecological 
influence , which are marked as )4,3,2,1(  ixi to provide assessment information on )4,3,2,1(  iYi , and the 
weight vector of three experts is T)31,31,31( O .
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Figure2. IAHP hierarchy of the solar power plant location problem
At first layer in Figure 2, experts compare these four places with respect to their comprehensive 
functions and construct, respectively, the interval positive complementary matrices 
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]5.0,5.0[]2.0,1.0[]4.0,3.0[]4.0,2.0[
]9.0,8.0[]5.0,5.0[]7.0,4.0[]3.0,1.0[
]7.0,6.0[]6.0,3.0[]5.0,5.0[]4.0,3.0[
]8.0,6.0[]9.0,7.0[]7.0,6.0[]5.0,5.0[
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Step 1. Utilize the fuzzy weighted averaging operator [30].
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]5.0,5.0[]3.0,17.0[]43.0,27.0[]4.0,2.0[
]83.0,7.0[]5.0,5.0[]4.0,2.0[]53.0,33.0[
]73.0,57.0[]8.0,6.0[]5.0,5.0[]63.0,43.0[
]8.0,6.0[]67.0,47.0[]57.0,37.0[]5.0,5.0[
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Step 2. Transform matrix R to an interval positive reciprocal matrix by Theorem 2.9:
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]0000.1,0000.1[]4152.0,2345.0[]7352.0,3640.0[]6444.0,2676.0[
]2638.4,4082.2[]0000.1,0000.1[]6444.0,2676.0[]1409.1,4738.0[
]7476.2,3602.1[]7372.3,5518.1[]0000.1,0000.1[]7705.1,7352.0[
]7372.3,5518.1[]1108.2,8765.0[]3602.1,5648.0[]0000.1,0000.1[
U
We write U in the form by formula (1):
¸¸
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
12345.03640.02676.0
2638.412676.04738.0
7476.27372.317352.0
7372.31108.23602.11
C           
¸¸
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
14152.07352.06444.0
4082.216444.01409.1
3602.15518.117705.1
5518.18765.05648.01
D
Step 3. Normalize the PCM to the transformation matrix by (a), we get
Selection of Optimal City
Total Solar 
Radiation
Landuse and 
Technology
Maintenance
Expense
Environmental and 
Ecological Influence
Anhui Jilin Sichuan Shanghai
Destination Laye
Criterion Layer
Schematic Layer
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¸¸
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
1568.00531.02083.01975.0
6684.02266.01531.03496.0
4307.08468.05722.05425.0
5858.04783.07783.07379.0
cB
¸¸
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
3007.01991.04875.02664.0
7242.04795.04273.04716.0
4090.07441.06630.07319.0
4667.04203.03745.04134.0
DB
Step 4. Calculate the transformed weights by (b), we can get 
,)1605.0,3644.0,6237.0,6727.0(~* TCw  TDw )3206.0,5377.0,6516.0,4283.0(~*  
Step 5. Calculate the optimal objective function value by (c), we get .9103.3,8358.3 **   DC CC
%.83.96)42/()9103.38358.3(2/)( **  u  nCCICCI dc
Step 7. Calculate the final priority vector by (e),we get
T
Cw )0881.0,2001.0,3424.0,3694.0(
*  , TDw )1654.0,2774.0,3362.0,2210.0(*  
Step 8. We obtain the interval weight vector:
Tw ])1654.0,0881.0[],2774.0,2001.0[],3424.0,3362.0[],3694.0,2210.0([ 
At second layer in Figure 2, experts provide four interval positive reciprocal (consistency) matrices 
of project )4,3,2,1(  iYi under factor )4,3,2,1(  ixi .
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
]1,1[]1,32[]31,41[]71,91[
]23,1[]1,1[]21,31[]51,71[
]4,3[]3,2[]1,1[]21,31[
]9,7[]7,5[]3,2[]1,1[
)(
1
yX ,           
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
]1,1[]32,21[]41,61[]61,81[
]223[]1,1[]52,41[]41,51[
]6,4[]4,25[]1,1[]1,21[
]8,6[]5,4[]2,1[]1,1[
)(
2 ˈ
yX
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
]1,1[]1,21[]31,51[]2,1[
]2,1[]1,1[]21,41[]3,23[
]5,3[]4,2[]1,1[]7,5[
]1,21[]32,31[]51,71[]1,1[
)(
3
yX ,
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
]1,1[]2/5,5/6[]2/9,2[]1,5/4[
]6/5,5/2[]1,1[]25,9/10[]3/2,5/2[
]2/1,9/2[]10/9,5/2[]1,1[]5/2,9/2[
]4/5,1[]25,23[]29,25[]1,1[
)(
4
yX
Calculate the relative weight of the interval number of each scheme under the single criterion.
yxW consists of the column vectors of above weight matrices and the comprehensive weights W .
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
3983][0.2645,0.1845][0.1082,0.0814][0.0560,0.0812][0.0629,0.
1990][0.1781,0.2244][0.1788,0.1246][0.0994,0.1098][0.0683,0.
1276][0.0968,0.5984][0.5120,0.3546][0.3260,0.2535][0.2411,0.
4298][0.3059,0.1146][0.0792,0.5186][0.4394,0.6278][0.5555,0.
yxW
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨
©
§
 x 
]1749.0,0777.0[
]1784.0,1000.0[
]4022.0,2739.0[
]5124.0,3133.0[
wWW yx
Step 9. Construct the possibility degree matrix based on W :
¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨
©
§
 
5000.00000.00000.00000.0
0000.15000.00000.00000.0
0000.10000.15000.02331.0
0000.10000.17769.05000.0
K
Finally, we get the rank order: 4%1003%1002%69.771 xxxx fff . To synthesize the assessment 
information of three experts, 1x is the best place for building solar power station, that is to say, Anhui 
Provence is the selected place to build more power station. This is in line with planning information in 
first row of Table 1, or inversely, our method could find out the reasonable solar station location. 
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Table 1. Key areas photovoltaic power construction scale in 2020 (Unit: gw)
Hebei Provence 1200
Shanxi Provence 1200
The Nei Monggol Autonomous Region 1200
Jiangsu Provence 800
Zhejiang Provence 800
Anhui Provence 600
Shandong Provence 1000
Guangdong Provence 600
Shanxi Provence 700
Qinghai Provence 1000
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 800
4. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have introduced a new method to derive the priority weights from interval positive 
complementary matrix. In the process of this IAHP, it is not requisite to consider the acceptably 
consistent of interval positive complementary matrix. And the new method reduce a complex system of 
MCDM, the new algorithm is also not complex. The main idea of the new method is to combine three 
techniques: the transformation formulate, cosine similarity measure and the interval numbers 
possibility degree matrix. The features of techniques can be consider as sufficient compensation for the 
process of deriving. Moreover, The new method does not need to assume any statistic and provides 
consistency indication for a PCM. Finally, we use a siting case of solar power station in China to verify 
the method is doable. We can get the information that distribution of solar energy in China partly play 
an important role in the selection of solar location.
However, it is necessary to extent the method for incomplete and imprecise PCM. Therefore, in the 
future research, we will improve the current prioritization methods with more projects and 
more extensive criterions, and the case study can be done in the comparison between IAHP with 
another model to solve the solar power station problem[25], for example, Fuzzy-AHP, Analytic 
Network Process, or comparison between TOPSIS and Maximise Agreement Heuristic, as can be seen 
in[24,27].
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